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
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National Institute of Mental Health

THE FUTURE OF CRIME



Crime and Delinquency Issues

U. S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES
Public Health Service
Alcohol, Drug Abuse, and Mental Health Administration

THE FUTURE OF CRIME



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**CRIME AND DELINQUENCY ISSUES:
A Monograph Series**

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THE FUTURE OF CRIME

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U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES
Public Health Service
Alcohol, Drug Abuse, and Mental Health Administration

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This monograph is one of a series on current issues and directions in the area of crime and delinquency. The series is being sponsored by the Center for Studies of Crime and Delinquency, National Institute of Mental Health, to encourage the exchange of views on issues and to promote in-depth analyses and development of insights and recommendations pertaining to them.

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Foreword

The crime and delinquency field has long been characterized by the lack of a future orientation. In contrast to fields such as economics and technology, where attempts to forecast the future are frequent and routine, little systematic effort has been made to analyze important changes that could occur in crime and delinquency problems in coming decades.¹ Are we moving into an era in which there is apt to be significantly more crime, delinquency, and violence? Or is the prospect rather one of increasing respect for the law? Or of no significant change at all? Questions like these need to be addressed if the crime and delinquency field is, in Harold Lasswell's words, "to use thought about the future as an intellectual tool, and to interrelate it to the other problem-solving tasks—the clarification of goal values, the description of past trends, the analysis of conditioning factors, the invention and assessment of policy options."²

In this monograph, Dr. Gresham M. Sykes takes on the challenging task of speculating about the possible future course of crime and delinquency in the United States. He draws for this purpose upon a rich background in sociology and criminology, as manifested in such prior publications as *Crime and Society* (1967), *Social Problems in America* (1971), and *Criminology* (1978). His interest in issues related to the future is also reflected in two earlier articles, "The Future of Criminality" in *American Behavioral Scientist* (1972) and "New Crimes for Old" in *American Scholar* (1971).

Readers of this monograph will discover rather quickly that Dr. Sykes is not greatly impressed by some of the sophisticated methods which analysts in other fields have developed for use in future studies—e.g., modeling, scenario construction, Delphi exercises.³ Notwithstanding the ingenuity of such methodologies, Dr. Sykes writes, "The basic approaches to forecasting remain few in number and of uncertain worth. Extrapolation from trends in the past, intuitive descriptions of things to come, and predictions based on theories of stability or change in the underlying causal variables constitute the major methods, and none can be accepted as a sure guide."

Confronted with such uncertainty, Dr. Sykes has elected to focus the bulk of his attention on the possible futures of six major aspects of the American social structure—the community, the family, the system of stratification, education, the economic structure, and what can be called the system of meaning or ultimate values. Drawing on existing sociological theories of crime causation, Dr. Sykes examines various ways in which stability and change in these aspects of the social structure could affect the course of future crime and delinquency problems.

Another feature of the monograph is the inclusion of white-collar crime and political crime within the focus of the discussion. Dr. Sykes suggests that coming decades may witness a significant increase in white-collar crime, as social norms concerning respect for private property continue to erode as the very notion of ownership “becomes ever more abstract, diluted, or impersonal in a bureaucratized mass society.” In the case of political crime, Dr. Sykes is less willing to venture predictions but rather argues the need for this type of crime to become more central in criminological thinking of the future.

We are pleased to make Dr. Sykes’ analysis of the future available to practitioners, researchers, and students in the crime and delinquency field. As possibly the first monograph-length publication on this particular topic, it is hoped that the analysis will help to stimulate more discussion and thought on the important topics that Dr. Sykes has addressed.

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¹ The principal exceptions to this generalization appear to be an article by Dr. Joseph F. Coates, “The Future of Crime in the United States From Now to the Year 2000,” *Policy Sciences*, Vol. 3, 1972, pp. 27-45, and an article by Dr. Leslie T. Wilkins, “Crime and Criminal Justice at the Turn of the Century,” *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences*, Vol. 408, July 1973, pp. 13-29.

² Harold Lasswell, “Future-Oriented Man,” *American Journal of Psychoanalysis*, Vol. 26:2, 1966, p. 159.

³ Daniel P. Harrison, *Social Forecasting Methodology: Suggestions for Research*, New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1976.

CHAPTER 1

Introduction

The Limits of Futurology

Books and articles on the future of society have flooded the professional literature in the social sciences for a quarter of a century. "The art of prophecy now commands considerable attention," notes Wilbert Moore. "The American Academy of Arts and Sciences has a Commission on the Year 2000; there is a British Commission on the Next Twenty Years; a periodical called *The Futurist*; a French series of papers called *Les Futuribles*; and these represent only samples. No government agency, no large private corporation, and no important professional group is without its own corps of forecasters, nor will they be—to make yet another prophecy—in the foreseeable future."¹

A number of social commentators have greeted this burgeoning interest with skepticism or hostility. Futurology, it has been said, is simply another intellectual fad, a claim to a predictive power that does not exist or a fascination with the apocalypse dressed up as science. Perhaps most important, however, has been the argument that these attempts to foresee the future represent an unwarranted revival of historical determinism. The idea that societies *must* change and develop along some fixed, predictable path has long been rejected by the great majority of American social scientists, and studies in futurology are viewed by many writers as based on a flawed philosophy of history.²

These criticisms must be taken seriously. There is a faddishness in the rush to prophesy, when the social sciences can scarcely provide an accurate picture of the present. Tomorrow's headlines continue to confound today's social forecasters. Predictions about the future are often obviously tinged with a personal predilection for an optimistic or a pessimistic view of the world. And despite the elaboration of jargon in futurology and the development of specialized statistical techniques, the basic approaches to social forecasting remain few in number and of uncertain worth. Extrapolations

from trends in the past, intuitive descriptions of things to come, and predictions based on theories of stability or change in the underlying causal variables constitute the major methods, and none can be accepted as a sure guide.³

In this monograph we try to get a glimpse of the future by using all three types of forecasting. But our main concern is with sociological theories of crime causation and social reactions to crime and with the variety of forecasts that have been offered concerning possible shifts in the underlying causal patterns. It is plain that the "laws of social change," sometimes presented as the basis for predictions of the future, are usually no more than assumptions. No talk of fitting statistical curves, the Delphi method, surprise-free projections, and canonical variations can transform these assumptions into proven principles of historical development.

It would be a grave mistake, however, to conclude that all studies of the future are, therefore, a waste of time. There are many areas of life—in the management of personal affairs, in the formation of public policy—where people must make predictions about the future, no matter how indeterminate they may consider the course of future events. The knowledge on which such predictions are based may be grossly inadequate, and the predictions may frequently turn out to be wrong, but they are better than nothing at all. The attempts to forecast the future will undoubtedly continue, and it is likely that additional knowledge can improve the chances of success. Many predictions may be based simply on the assumption that the future will be the same as the past or that existing patterns of change will persist, but such predictions may be extremely useful despite their lack of underlying theory.⁴

The greatest value of the study of the future, however, probably lies in the fact that we are encouraged to think explicitly and systematically about the range of future possibilities. Sociology may not be able to predict with any certainty the path that society will follow, in large measure because the future is rooted in the unforeseeable choices people make about what that future should be. The future is invented; that is to say, it is not the product of immutable laws.⁵ But in analyzing the many different possible futures, sociology can provide a better understanding of the implications of different choices and the social conditions that favor—but do not determine—the emergence of one future rather than another. Futurology, then, is best thought of not as the study of the inevitable course of society in the decades to come but as the construction of a chart upon which the course has yet to be drawn. "The sociologist is just a man in the crow's nest who knows no

more of the sea than his fellows," said Edward Ross, one of the founders of American sociology, writing more than 50 years ago. "But from his position he will catch sight of coming dangers—shoals, sunken rocks, derelicts, cross-currents—before they are seen by those on deck."⁶ If the following pages on the future of crime can accomplish that, they will have accomplished much.

The Crisis in Crime

The need to consider alternative futures in the field of criminal justice is particularly acute because, in the opinion of many, attempts to deal with the problem of crime in the United States have reached a crisis. The word "crisis" is overused, it is true, and implies an agreed-upon measuring stick of disordered functioning, when such a measuring stick does not in fact exist. Yet today's problems in dealing with crime are so glaring, so troublesome to many people, it is almost impossible to avoid the conclusion that existing methods of handling crime have arrived at some sort of turning point.

First, the crime rate increased dramatically in the 1960s and the early 1970s and appeared to reflect real change in the criminality of various segments of American society. Although the flood of crime now shows some signs of abating, there is no assurance that the crime rate has definitely passed its peak. Indeed, changes in American society in the coming decades could push the rates of some crimes still higher, as we shall see in our later discussion.

Part of the increase in the crime rate during the last two decades can be attributed to the increased accuracy of official statistics, the increase in the proportion of the population which is urban, and changes in the age structure of American society, as children of the Baby Boom after World War II moved into their adolescent years and swelled the ranks of the younger age groups most prone to criminal behavior.⁷ If the present low birth rate continues, the proportion of the population aged 14 to 17 may decrease by nearly one-third by 1990, before beginning to move upward again at the end of the century, and this could result in a significant drop in the rate of juvenile delinquency in the next 10 years or so.⁸ (See table 1.)

It also appears likely, however, on the basis of the same population projections, that the proportion of the population aged 18 to 44 will be slightly larger in 1990 than in 1975, an increase of more than 21 million in absolute numbers, and this age group contributes most heavily to adult crime and adult correctional

Table 1—Population Projections for the United States by Age Groups, 1975 to the Year 2000

Year	Age group (percent)				
	Under 14	14-17	18-44	45-64	65 and over
1975	23.1	7.9	38.1	20.4	10.5
1980	20.8	7.1	41.2	19.7	11.2
1985	20.6	6.2	42.6	18.9	11.7
1990	21.4	5.2	42.2	18.9	12.2
1995	21.4	5.6	40.2	20.3	12.4
2000	20.4	6.2	38.6	22.7	12.2

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Current Population Reports*, Series P-25, No. 704, "Projections of the Population of the United States: 1977 to 2050 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977, p. 10). The projections in this table are based on the intermediate Series II assumptions with regard to future fertility.

facilities. Without new methods of handling convicted offenders, the existing correctional system must become much larger or become even more dangerously overcrowded than it is at the present time.⁹ Furthermore, the increase in the average age of the population is likely to have a different effect on different kinds of crime. Those offenses that persons under 18 are far more likely to commit than are older persons include vandalism, burglary, larceny, auto theft, and arson. These can be called "youth" crimes, and they will probably decline in the next several decades. Rates of other crimes, however, which are committed to a disproportionate extent by older people—crimes such as public drunkenness, gambling offenses, fraud, embezzlement, and murder—are likely to increase during the same period.

Second, in many criminal courts in the United States today, plea bargaining has become a necessity if the court system is not to founder. A fair, impartial trial, with all the safeguards provided by the laws of criminal procedure, is an ideal much discussed in legal textbooks and journals but seldom encountered in practice. Instead, defendants frequently plead guilty in return for a reduced charge or a lighter sentence, and many writers claim that mere expediency guides the process.¹⁰ Since about 90 percent of all criminal defendants now enter a guilty plea, a small change in defendants' behavior (a shift, let us say, from 90 percent to 80

percent pleading guilty) would double the trial load of the courts. A few writers argue that guilty pleas have always formed the great bulk of all pleas and that the growing workload of the courts has been overrated as a factor.¹¹ The dominant view, however, is that the prevalence of plea bargaining is largely attributable to the growing problem of too many cases for courts with too few resources.¹² What appears to be incontestable, in any event, is that the court system in the United States cannot continue to function in its present form unless the existing high rate of guilty pleas is maintained. A valued social institution in such a vulnerable position cannot fail to make many people uneasy, and there is also the fear that coercing or cajoling so many suspected offenders into pleading guilty is subverting the just administration of the criminal law.

Third, disenchantment with imprisonment as a means of rehabilitation has become widespread. Penology, it is commonly argued, is morally and intellectually bankrupt, and the criticisms often come from persons engaged in correctional work in institutions as well as from persons outside the field. Not only are custodial institutions alleged to be ineffective in reforming the offender, but the tendency for inmates to organize within the prison walls on the basis of ethnic militancy or radical ideology, along with the tendency to impose longer sentences on violent offenders, threatens to make the administration of custodial institutions more difficult and dangerous. Serious, widespread rioting appears to be an increasing threat, likely to end in tragedy, as in the case of the uprising at the New Mexico State Penitentiary.

Fourth, corrections in the community have long been regarded by many writers as providing the best opportunity for an enlightened program of rehabilitating criminal offenders. During the last 20 years or so, the supervision of offenders in the community has become an increasingly important part of rehabilitative efforts. By 1965, more than half of all convicted offenders were placed on probation, and, since then, the proportion has continued to increase. A growing number of writers, however, have begun to voice the suspicion that probation and parole have little direct influence on recidivism. Only offenders who are likely to stay out of trouble are selected for corrections in the community; and it is this fact, it is argued, rather than whatever services may be provided in programs of community corrections, that lies behind the apparent superiority of probation and parole. While supervision in the community may be far preferable to confinement on humanitarian grounds—or on the grounds of cost—scientific evidence of the effectiveness of probation and parole is lacking. It has

become increasingly clear that the problem of rehabilitating criminals in or out of prisons still awaits a proven solution.¹³

Fifth, there are many people who believe that the criminal law has become vastly overextended, reaching into areas that are not the law's business.¹⁴ Public drunkenness, the use of drugs, prostitution, gambling—all absorb much of the time and resources of the justice system, while serious crimes receive insufficient attention. "In this country," it has been said, "we have a highly moralistic criminal law and a long tradition of using it as an instrument of coercing men toward virtue. It is a singularly inept instrument for that purpose. It is also an undeniably costly one, both in terms of harm done and in terms of the neglect of the proper tasks of law enforcement."¹⁵ Unless we decriminalize large areas of behavior, it is claimed, the administration of criminal justice will remain hopelessly clogged with trivial cases.

Finally, the administration of criminal justice appears to be at a critical turning point in the United States, not simply because the amount of crime to be handled has come to place a severe strain on a system ill equipped to cope with the problem, but there is also the fact that law enforcement agencies themselves have come to be viewed with great suspicion by a great many people.

It is true, of course, that public opinion polls indicate the majority of people in the United States view local police in a favorable light, insofar as most people are willing to say that, in general, local police are doing a good or an average job.¹⁶ Nonetheless, sympathy for the police is not infrequently tinged with suspicion; and discriminatory acts on the part of the police, as well as the misuse of the police for the suppression of political dissent at both the local and national levels, have made many people wary. Concern for the crime problem in America today must take into account the abuse of power by those charged with the enforcement of the law.¹⁷

A fear that the police will be employed as a means of political domination has, of course, long been a part of American political thought. During the 1960s the fear seemed to have become a reality in the eyes of a large number of people, particularly the young, the poor, and members of minority groups, as protests against racism, and the Vietnam War led to violent confrontations.¹⁸ And in recent years, according to many writers, distrust of officialdom has become widespread in the wake of disclosures concerning the misuse of power by the office of the President, the FBI, and the CIA. Many people see the danger of a police state as hardly

less threatening than the criminal behavior that the police are supposed to control.¹⁹

If the United States fails to find effective methods for dealing with criminal behavior, argues Leslie Wilkins, it is almost certain that the justice system will break down by the year 2000.²⁰ It is equally possible that American society will neither succumb to its present difficulties nor resolve them, although new techniques for dealing with crime, new ways of thinking about crime, new legal concepts, and new legal procedures will be brought into play. When these changes occur, they will involve moral, political, social, and legal issues as complex as any encountered by American society in dealing with criminal behavior in the past.

Two conflicting views of the years ahead are often found in the literature of futurism. On the one hand, we are presented with a world in which many social problems have been solved or are at least on their way to solution. Material levels of living, the environment, political freedom, world peace—all are shown as being well along the path of progress.²¹ On the other hand, we find the world of the future described as vastly overpopulated, politically oppressed, polluted, and a mere step away from nuclear catastrophe.²² The future of crime can be viewed in a similar polarized fashion. It is possible to envision a society marked by increasing violence and attacks on private property, by intolerance of any deviation from an obsessive morality, and by far-reaching police surveillance coupled with a loss of civil liberties in a totalitarian social order. It is also possible (although admittedly more difficult, in this disenchanted era) to envision a society with widespread acceptance of and conformity to the criminal law, a modest view of the proper reach of the State, and methods of law enforcement that are just, humane, and effective.

The actual future may match one of these opposing views, some mixture of the two, or the system of justice may bear little resemblance to either.²³ But if we do not examine the future, we may be caught unaware and lose our opportunity to shape the course of future events. An examination of possible futures may aid us in helping to alleviate some of the difficulties that will confront the administration of justice in the United States in the coming decades.

CHAPTER 2

Future Trends in Crime Causation

Theoretical Perspectives

Theories of crime causation have changed markedly over the years, reflecting growing knowledge derived from empirical research as well as changing assumptions about the nature of humankind, ideological arguments concerning the proper relationship between the individual and the State, and society's view of the wrongfulness of the behavior forbidden by the criminal law.²⁴

In the eighteenth century, crime was seen largely as a deliberate choice among alternative courses of action. Motivated by lust, greed, or malice—the inevitable well-springs of much human conduct—people would select the criminal path, if the pains did not outweigh the pleasures. It was the responsibility of the State, argued Beccaria, Bentham, and other founders of the classical school of criminology, to make punishment so quick and certain that law-abiding behavior was obviously preferable.

In the latter part of the nineteenth century, after the publication of Darwin's *Origin of Species* and *The Descent of Man*, biological characteristics played a large part in the explanation of human behavior. The theories of Cesare Lombroso, with their depiction of the criminal as stigmatized by the primitive characteristics of an earlier human form, found an enthusiastic worldwide audience. Many people became convinced that the sources of crime were to be found not in the uncontrolled will but in defects of the body. After Lombroso's theories collapsed under the attacks of his critics, the electrifying ideas of Freudian psychiatry came to dominate the scene, and crime was seen as an expression of unconscious emotional conflicts bred in the traumas of childhood. In the 1930s, the popularity of this viewpoint began to wane, in part, perhaps, because the Great Depression helped to shift attention from individual failings to the malfunctioning of society as the source of social problems. In any event, criminology became largely a part of sociology in the liberal arts curriculum of universities and colleges,

and crime increasingly came to be viewed as an outcome of the social environment, often in terms of inadequate socialization due to broken families or the loss of primary-group ties under the destructive impact of urbanization and industrialization.

Much of the present sociological theorizing about crime causation can be divided into four main categories. First, there are arguments clustered around the idea that crime is largely a function of the inability of the individual to achieve by legitimate means the goals inculcated by society, coupled with an erosion of the restraining forces of social norms.²⁵ Second, the causes of crime are seen as rooted in the disorganization or ineffectiveness of agencies of social control, including both informal groups (such as the family, neighborhood, and friends) and the formal organizations of the larger society.²⁶ Third, there is the idea that crime is learned behavior that is acquired in an ordinary learning process, where the individual happens to be associated with people who hold criminal or delinquent values and attitudes. The model is that of a normal individual growing up in an abnormal atmosphere in which crime is the approved form of conduct.²⁷ And fourth—somewhat outside the present focus of our interest—there is a theory about crime and deviant behavior that centers on the social-psychological dynamics of the process by which the individual becomes criminal or is so labeled by others.²⁸ For some of the writers concerned with this latter view, an attempt to find the cause of crime in the characteristics which distinguish criminals and non-criminals is something of a wild goose chase. Society labels certain people criminal, it is said, because they appear politically threatening to those in power, because they are hated or despised, or because there is a quota of arrests to be filled. The important social reality is the act of labeling, rather than the attributes of the individual linked to the social environment and supposedly causing criminal behavior; and the explanation of crime is to be sought not in factors that lead the individual into illegality, but in the ability of a variety of interest groups to use the power of the State to categorize individuals as lawbreakers.²⁹

These theories of crime causation are not as much in conflict with one another as it might appear, for to a large extent they reflect a selective interest. Much criminal behavior, for example, appears to involve a lack of legitimate means to achieve socially approved goals, coupled with an erosion of normative restraints. It is also true that the same behavior can often be seen as a result, in part, of the breakdown of formal and informal social controls. The individual's relationships with family, friends, and neighbors provide the bonds along which normative demands can flow, and,

as these social groups become disorganized or ineffective, the likelihood of deviant or criminal behavior increases. Similarly, the idea that crime results from exposure to criminal values and attitudes that outweigh demands for conforming behavior is by no means inconsistent with the idea that inability to reach socially acceptable goals sets the stage for socialization into criminal behavior patterns. And the extent to which official labels of criminal and noncriminal match the realities of criminal behavior must be taken into account by any theory that attempts to explain crime in its social setting rather than as an isolated piece of behavior studied in a laboratory.

This is not to say that conflicts among those theoretical orientations do not exist or that there are no problems in trying to establish the characteristics that distinguish criminals from noncriminals. Yet insofar as we are committed to explaining differences in the rates of criminal behavior on the basis of characteristics that are shaped by the social environment, these theoretical positions can often be seen as complementary rather than inconsistent or as possessing different degrees of usefulness for explaining different kinds of crimes. Our purpose here, in any event, is not to develop a detailed exegesis of these different viewpoints or to arrive at a judgment about the superiority of a particular theoretical orientation. Instead, we are concerned with the extent to which existing sociological theories of crime causation can throw some light on how changes in American social structure will affect the future course of criminal behavior. The community, the family, the system of stratification, education, the economic structure, and what can be called the system of meaning or ultimate values—these constitute the major aspects of the structure of society,³⁰ and all are likely to be modified in the coming decades in this era of accelerated social change. It is the possible impact of such changes on the kind and amount of crime exhibited by American society that occupies our attention in the following pages.

The Spatial Distribution of Crime

The spatial distribution of crime has provided one of the central topics of theory and research in criminology. Differences among regions, rural and urban areas, cities of different sizes, and types, and neighborhoods within the city have all been examined for their possible impact on the incidence of crime and delinquency. These studies, often grouped under the heading of the ecology of crime, show fairly clear and consistent patterns, which are usually

interpreted on the basis of the idea that variation in the rates of criminal and delinquent behavior among geographical areas is a product, at least in part, of differences in the spatial distribution of social and cultural environments.³¹

In general, it has been found that crime and delinquency are far more apt to flourish in the city than in the small town, village, or countryside—although there are differences among different kinds of criminal behavior—and the larger the city, the higher the crime rate is likely to be.³² There is a tendency for cities that are economically well off to have lower crime rates than cities that are economically depressed, and the sex ratio in the community is also related to crime. Higher crime rates are likely to be associated with a higher proportion of males in the city.³³

Studies of variation of crime rates within the city indicate that crime is linked to characteristics of neighborhoods or census tracts, such as the amount of substandard housing, overcrowding, and commercial and industrial land use. Furthermore, there is a strong tendency for deteriorating areas to maintain their high delinquency rates over the years, although the composition of the population may change markedly.³⁴

As far as regional variation is concerned, the South has persistently shown the highest homicide rate in the Nation, although the difference between the South and other regions appears to be declining. The western region, however, exceeds the rest of the country with regard to the rates for rape, aggravated assault, and burglary, and larceny-theft. The rates for robbery and auto theft are highest in the Northeast (see table 2).

The explanation for these relationships has generally been derived from the theoretical perspectives sketched in earlier. Urbanization, it is argued, has frequently produced high levels of social disorganization, particularly among the poor and newcomers to the city. Drawn to the city by the lure of employment, high wages, and the excitement and services of the urban setting, and pushed off the land by declining opportunities, migrants from abroad and from rural areas within the United States have struggled to adjust to a new and often disturbing world. For many of those born at the bottom of the socioeconomic ladder in these cities, the problems of adjustment and survival have been no less acute. Constantly urged to succeed by every aspect of American culture, great masses of people find themselves trapped in dead-end jobs—if, indeed, they have any jobs at all. At the same time, families and neighborhoods and voluntary associations disintegrate under the destructive impact of poverty. The social bonds that have served as channels for the socialization of the young and the constraining

Table 2—Crime Rates by Regions, 1976

Region	Crime Rate					
	Murder and non-negligent manslaughter	Forcible rape	Robbery	Aggravated assault	Burglary	Larceny- theft
Northeast	7.0	20.4	288.1	208.1	1446.7	2541.9
Northcentral	7.4	23.4	175.8	175.1	1195.2	2944.0
Southern	11.3	26.3	139.9	251.7	1346.2	2716.6
Western	8.5	38.9	206.8	294.1	1962.1	3740.0
						645.5
						402.1
						291.3
						532.4

Source: Federal Bureau of Investigation, *Uniform Crime Reports* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977), p. 34.

influence of peer groups committed to conformity start to fall away. The demands for conformity are apt to be supplanted by exposure to the values, norms, attitudes, and beliefs favorable to the violation of the law, as described by Sutherland in his theory of differential association.³⁵ Alienated, frustrated, with little hope for the future, and cut off from the conventional society, many individuals living in the poorer sections of the city are likely to be drawn into the patterns of criminality that abound close at hand.

For members of minority groups, the situation is made worse by the discrimination that further bars the road to success, transforms the slum into a ghetto, and increases the chances of being stigmatized with the label of criminal and a prison record.³⁶ These problems are compounded still further in large cities such as New York, Chicago, Los Angeles, and Detroit, that have been particularly plagued by unemployment, the lack of adequate housing, large numbers of persons on welfare, and the difficulties confronting populations immigrating to an urban setting.

This portrayal of the sources of crime appears to be most relevant for "conventional" crimes against property, such as burglary, larceny, and robbery which form the great bulk of the offenses appearing in the Crime Index of the FBI. For crimes of violence, such as murder, assault, and rape, the theoretical emphasis is apt to shift from the frustration of economic goals to the influence of a subculture of violence often found in the urban slum. Crimes of violence may give expression to a diffuse rage that stems from social failure and goes unchecked because restraining ties have been eroded by poverty. In many cases, however, it is clear that crimes of violence represent behavior that is demanded or expected according to the values and norms of the group in which the individual has been socialized or to which he or she belongs. "The significance of a jostle," notes Wolfgang, "a slightly derogatory remark, or the appearance of a weapon in the hands of an adversary are stimuli differentially perceived and interpreted by Negroes and whites, males and females. Social expectations of response in particular types of social interaction result in differential 'definitions of the situation.' A male is usually expected to defend the name and honor of his mother, the virtue of womanhood . . . and to accept no derogation about his race (even from a member of his own race), his age, or his masculinity."³⁷ The quick use of force as an expression of daring, courage, or in defense of status, Wolfgang argues, appears to be a matter of culture, especially for lower class males of both races.³⁸

It is possible that this cultural acceptance of violence is found in the lower class in large urban areas because that is a segment of

American society where many individuals have become so alienated from the larger society that they have no faith in the formal institutions of legitimate authority. Unable or unwilling to use the police and the courts, individuals must depend on their personal strength and courage to defend their persons and their possessions as best they can. The ability to do so becomes a major virtue—an aspect of the bundle of traits sometimes labeled *machismo* and held out as a pattern of behavior to be emulated and admired.

The concept of personal honor tied to a tradition of violence is not confined to young males in the urban lower class. According to a number of writers, it has also been a feature of rural life in the South—and has long been used as an explanation of regional variation in the homicide rate in America. The disproportionate amount of violent crime in the southern States, it is argued, is attributable to an acceptance of violence that has been part of a regional subculture since long before the Civil War.³⁹

To a large extent, the ecological patterns of crime are undoubtedly a reflection of the process of urbanization and industrialization that began in the nineteenth century. After World War II, however, a new element was added—a movement to the suburbs by the white middle class that left the poor (particularly poor blacks) locked in the decaying central city. “By the 1960s,” it has been pointed out, “the suburbanization of middle-income whites and the northward migration of low-income southern blacks were changing the racial composition of cities in the Northeast and Northcentral States. It became clear to many that the most serious future urban problems would have to do with race and low income.”⁴⁰ Since the depression of the 1930s, hopes for dealing with the problems of the city have shifted from subsidizing housing to planning agencies for the creation of metropolitan government, then to the War on Poverty and model cities programs, and finally to revenue sharing. Today many of the problems remain unsolved, but there is not much confidence that the Federal Government—or any other level of government—knows how to make things better.⁴¹

In the coming decades, the process of suburbanization is likely to continue, and the differences in annual income between those in the central city and those in the suburb will probably increase. The economic problems of those remaining in the city in the northeast and northcentral regions of the United States are apt to be particularly acute, if population (and job opportunities) continue to grow faster in the West and the South than in the rest of the country.⁴² Urban slum areas are apt to become increasingly populated by blacks and the members of other minority

groups. As rising costs and shrinking tax resources undermine municipal budgets, city services in the form of police protection and special educational programs and welfare will become increasingly difficult to provide. Some declining cities may reverse their downward path. Others will probably continue to weaken, perhaps stabilizing at a much lower level of activity.⁴³ "One may easily misread the currents of one's time when they swirl in so many directions," conclude Gorham and Glazer, "but it is our sense that a period of assessment of the proper and possible reach of government is upon us. This results from a number of trends which have converged in the mid-1970s: widespread disillusionment with government's capacity to deal effectively with social problems generally and urban distress in particular; and a related resistance to further public spending in face of large, built-in increases in public spending (*e.g.*, pensions and social security, etc.)."⁴⁴ The problems of the city, then, are unlikely to be erased by Federal intervention, contrary to the hopes of many programs of social reform undertaken in the sixties. If advances are to occur, we are told by many writers, we must depend largely on the growing health of the general economy.

If this far-from-encouraging view turns out to be correct, many of the pressures that have helped to produce crime in the past would continue undiminished, and some might increase substantially. Slum conditions may get worse, not better, as neighborhoods continue to decay and city services diminish. Unemployment rates in the central city are likely to rise still higher, if job opportunities continue to move to the suburbs with the exodus of the white middle class, increasing the economic frustration of the urban poor. "Semi-skilled and low-skilled jobs are rapidly suburbanizing out of reach of the central-city poor," asserts Neil Gold, "particularly the minority poor. Conversely, new jobs that are being created in central cities are unsuited to the occupational requirements of the central-city poor, but are suited to the skill level of suburban commuters. The resulting mismatch of jobs and low-income people has grave implications for the central city, for disadvantaged groups isolated in the urban core, and for the capacity of metropolitan areas to achieve equitable urban growth patterns."⁴⁵ In short, the problem of a large mass of alienated people, trapped at the bottom of the socioeconomic ladder in cities where traditional social ties have disintegrated, is likely to grow worse. The likely result is higher rates of crimes, such as homicide, assault, robbery, rape, and larceny, that have long been associated with urban poverty.

The situation may be made still worse by a rising rate of immigration, particularly from Mexico, the Philippines, Hong Kong, Latin America, and the Caribbean. According to Commissioner Leonard F. Chapman, Jr., of the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, legal immigrants and their descendants will total some 15 million in the next three decades—approximately 25 percent of the estimated total population increase, and illegal immigrants are expected to outnumber legal immigrants by two to one.⁴⁶ Close to 10 percent of all Mexicans actually reside in the United States, it has been claimed, and Los Angeles has the third largest concentration of Mexicans, ranking only below Mexico City and Guadalajara.⁴⁷

It is true, as Wayne Cornelius has pointed out, "A very predictable thing happens in this country whenever the economy takes a sharp turn for the worst: the illegal alien is rediscovered. Politicians, journalists, organized labor, and other interest groups rush to blame him for every imaginable problem afflicting American society, from high unemployment to rising crime rates, escalating social-service costs, overpopulation, and balance-of-payment deficits."⁴⁸ Little is actually known about the impact of illegal immigration, Cornelius argues, particularly in terms of competition for low-skill, low-wage, low-status jobs, and the common view of the illegal immigrant as a burden on American society may be in error. Nonetheless, it seems clear that many of these immigrants—both legal and illegal—lack the skills demanded by an industrial society and are apt to be isolated in urban ghettos, set off by language and culture as well as socioeconomic status. While a portion of these immigrants will undoubtedly avoid the corrosive effects of urban poverty and discrimination, a large number are likely to suffer acute problems of adjustment and assimilation in an era when the idea of America as a melting pot is often scorned and ethnic pride frequently serves as an important component of the individual's identity. If the hopes that brought these immigrants to the United States prove to be impossible to fulfill, and if a "third-world consciousness" becomes a bitter sense of isolation from American society, there will be additional pressures tending to push the crime rate upward.⁴⁹

For some writers, the prospect of unsolved urban problems means an almost certain increase in both crime and attempts to find greater personal security, expressed in the following quotation from the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence:

Central business districts in the heart of the city, surrounded by mixed areas of accelerating deterioration, will

be partially protected by large numbers of people shopping or working in commercial buildings during daytime hours, plus a substantial police presence, and will be largely deserted except for police patrols during nighttime hours.

High-rise apartment buildings, and residential compounds protected by private guards and security devices will be fortified cells for upper-middle and high-income populations living at prime locations in the city.

Suburban neighborhoods, geographically far removed from the central city, will be protected mainly by economic homogeneity and by distance from population groups with the highest propensities to commit crimes.

Lacking a sharp change in federal and state policies, ownership of guns will be almost universal in the suburbs, homes will be fortified by an array of devices from window grills to electronic surveillance equipment, armed citizen volunteers in cars will supplement inadequate police patrols in neighborhoods to the central city, and extreme left-wing and right-wing groups will have tremendous armories of weapons which could be brought into play with or without provocation.

High-speed, patrolled expressways will be sanitized corridors connecting safe areas, and private automobiles, taxicabs, and commercial vehicles will be routinely equipped with unbreakable glass. . . .

Between the unsafe, deteriorating central city on the one hand and the network of safe, prosperous areas and sanitized corridors on the other, there will be, not unnaturally, intensifying hatred and deepened division. Violence will increase further, and the defensive response of the affluent will become still more elaborate.⁵⁰

The retreat to the suburbs, of course, may prove far from effective as a means of avoiding crime. The crime rate for murder, assault, burglary, and auto theft is now much the same in suburban areas as in cities of 25,000 to 50,000, and suburban areas rank slightly above these cities in terms of rape.⁵¹ This may be due to the social disorganization that can accompany geographical mobility, even when economic problems are not a major factor, the newness of some of these suburban communities, or a growing similarity of the social environments in cities and suburbs. Furthermore, it is possible that attempts to find a sanctuary in the suburbs may be undone by the growth of what can be called urban piracy—a social pattern, that is to say, in which lawbreakers living in the central city engage in forays against the affluent suburbs, using superhighways or mass transportation as avenues of attack and retreat.

The diffusion of crime throughout the metropolitan area may be offset in some cities by deliberate efforts to establish "free zones" in which violations of the law (particularly those dealing with the so-called vices such as gambling, prostitution, and the use of drugs) are conveniently overlooked. In effect, by permitting violations of the law that absorb much of the time and resources of the police and confining such violations to an area that can more easily be kept under surveillance, law enforcement agencies may hope to keep what cannot be suppressed under some degree of control. As in the case of the red-light districts, a feature of many American cities in the past, the public may be willing to tolerate a measure of wrongdoing as long as it is carefully circumscribed.⁵²

A few writers have suggested that the suburban middle class might return to the city and revitalize the city's economy, as children grow up and leave home and a suburban lifestyle loses its appeal. In general, however, this appears unlikely. "Middle-class people," argues Herbert Gans, "moved to the suburbs mainly to get a single-family house, and by now almost all of the commercial, cultural, and other facilities they need, including job opportunities, have followed them there. To them, cities mean old apartments, noise and congestion, as well as high rates of crime and violence, all of which are to be avoided; and the few cities that provide excitement and unusual entertainment can be visited on weekends or during vacations."⁵³ The rising number of persons living alone and childless couples will not lead to an urban return, says Gans, because such individuals have come to prefer the suburbs. The number of brownstone renovators has been greatly exaggerated, he argues, for their dedication and success make fine copy for the real estate and "lifestyle" pages of the newspapers but are no assurance of an urban revival. And the return of the middle class to the city because of an energy crisis is also unlikely. When energy costs sky-rocket, Gans claims, middle-class suburbanities will not come back to the city to save gasoline and heating oil. Rather, they will first try to persuade the Federal Government to subsidize their bills, and, if that fails, they will move to new energy-saving apartment houses outside the city.

The movement back to the city may be somewhat greater than Gans envisions, if residential redevelopment is carried out on a large-scale basis, rather than being left to individuals.⁵⁴ And a drastic curtailment of the supply of oil in the coming decade—due, perhaps, to the outbreak of war—could lead to a dramatic change in population distribution. In general, however, the continuation of movement to the suburbs and the further decline of the central

city appear to be the most likely pattern. "We simply do not, as a collective body, wish to revitalize the cities," James Coleman declared at a recent conference on the future of the metropolis. "If we did, we would do so. I mean quite simply that we desire other things more."⁵⁵

One of the inadvertent consequences of our choice, however, is apt to be an increase in the crime rate of the central city, as well as an increase in the crime rate in the suburbs, as such aspects of urban life as anonymity, impersonalization, and individual isolation move toward the edges of the metropolitan area. Regional differences in the homicide rate may decline as the South becomes more like the North in terms of income and social structure, but if there is in fact a cultural tradition of violence that still exerts an influence, the homicide rate for the Nation might show some increase as population flows into the southern States.

In the past, the bulk of the criminological research on the spatial distribution of crime has centered on rural-urban differences, variation within and between cities, and variation among regions, as we have indicated. As the distribution of the population continues to develop new patterns, however, as suburbs further blur the rural-urban distinction, for example, so that low levels of population density no longer provide a meaningful measure of rural residence, the focus of research will undoubtedly change as well. At the present time, more than half of the American population does not live in the central city but in adjoining metropolitan areas. The problem of crime within these adjoining suburbs will be of increasing concern in the future, both in terms of criminological theory and the administration of the criminal law.

Family Structure

In the early part of this century, the interest of American criminology in the influence of the urban setting on crime was matched and possibly surpassed by an interest in the influence of the family; and, indeed, much of the impact of the city was attributed to changes in the family produced by urban residence.⁵⁶ Stress was placed on the causal role of families broken by death, divorce, or desertion, the absence of the mother because of a job outside the home, and the plight of the illegitimate child without a father.⁵⁷ These were termed defective homes—and they were apt to be marked, it was said, by defective or inadequate socialization which led to delinquency and crime. First, the child was likely to suffer from emotional deprivation which could produce "personal mal-

adjustment," or a generalized resentment directed against society, or a desperate search for peer approval among those already involved in delinquent behavior patterns. Second, the child was likely to suffer from a lack of parental discipline and thus fail to internalize the values, attitudes, and social norms that lead to conformity with the law. The need for children to be linked to adults with whom they could identify was thought to be particularly important. Girls from broken homes were most apt to commit sex offenses, while boys from broken homes were likely to engage in forms of delinquency involving theft, assault, and vandalism.⁵⁸ The important point was that both emotional deprivation and a lack of discipline in the home led to a situation in which there were increased chances that the child could be infected by the criminal or delinquent values and attitudes existing in the community. Theories concerning broken homes, then, were inclined to see the child as being prepared for delinquency by defective socialization in the family—a process completed by the corrupting influence of the larger social environment. Since divorce, desertion, working mothers, and illegitimacy were most frequent in the lower class (along with exposure to the evil influences of slum life), a correlation between poverty and delinquency was to be expected. It was not simply a matter of economic need, however, for the breakdown of "normal" family structure was the key element.

In the early thirties, the work of Shaw and McKay presented a significant challenge to this view of the crucial role of the "normal" family. Their influential studies in Chicago indicated that, contrary to both popular belief and the theories of sociology, broken homes were far less important as a cause of crime than had been commonly supposed, and that, although delinquents did seem to be drawn from broken homes to a somewhat greater extent than nondelinquents, the difference was not very great.⁵⁹ In subsequent decades, the importance given to broken families in sociological theorizing about the causes of crime and delinquency diminished sharply. Thrasher's work on gangs, Merton's theory of anomie, Sutherland's theory of differential association, Cohen's study of delinquency as a response to status deprivation—all received far more attention, and in none of this was the broken family accorded a major causal role.⁶⁰ No other term in the history of criminological thought has been so overworked and so discredited as "broken homes," declared Hermann Mannheim in the middle of the 1960s. "For many years universally proclaimed as the most obvious explanation of both juvenile delinquency and adult crime, it is now often regarded as the 'black sheep' in the otherwise

respectable family of criminological theories," he asserted, "and most writers shamefacedly turn their backs to it."⁶¹

The reduced importance of the family as a factor in theories concerning the causation of delinquency has not been solely a matter of scientific evidence. As Wilkinson points out, the widespread acceptance in the early 1900s of the idea that the broken family was a major source of delinquency was much influenced by the rural perspective of many sociologists who were inclined to place a high value on kinship bonds, the role of tradition, and the need for stability.⁶² Social workers were also inclined to find the cause of crime and delinquency in the "inadequate" family which could be worked with, modified, and improved, rather than in social class which was a political and economic problem beyond their professional expertise. And for the public at large, divorce was widely viewed as immoral, a one-parent family as an anomaly, and a working wife as a woman who neglected her proper social role.⁶³

After the depression of the thirties, attitudes toward the family began to change. As the divorce rate approximately doubled between 1930 and 1970, and the rate of women's participation in the labor force increased from 24 percent to 41 percent in the same period of time, the sociological view of the "normal" family underwent a transformation. "Conceptions of the centrality of the family and the immorality of divorce have changed," says Wilkinson. "Women have found meaning in other roles besides those of homemaker and reformer and are less likely to stress the virtues of the traditional family."⁶⁴ Sociologists are no longer inclined to see only the intact family as normal, she argues, and are reluctant to trace the ills of society—including crime—to a lack of parental love and discipline within the home. Instead, the class structure is apt to be selected as a source of social problems. The rejection of flawed family structure as a cause of crime and delinquency, she concludes, has been influenced greatly by ideology and further research is needed to see if this rejection is justified.

It is possible that the lack of attention paid to the broken family in much of today's theorizing about crime and delinquency is a valid correction of an earlier, sentimental view of "normal" family life rather than an expression of ideological bias. It is also possible that the broken or incomplete family was in fact an important cause of crime and delinquency prior to 1930, as an earlier generation of sociologists believed. But in subsequent decades, as public schooling and the mass media began to play a larger role in the socialization of the child, the importance of the family as an agency of socialization may have declined sharply. There is insufficient

evidence to come to a sure judgment about these possibilities, but Wilkinson is undoubtedly correct when she argues that the causal role of the broken family is not a closed issue and warrants continuing study, in terms of its influence not only in the past and present but in the future as well. The fact that the concept of "normality" generally involves a value judgment when applied to various familial arrangements should not blind us to the possibility that various familial arrangements have an impact on the socialization of the individual and subsequent behavior.

The future of the American family is, of course, a matter of endless debate in which prophecies of imminent collapse compete with declarations of faith in the durability of the family as a social institution. In general, most sociologists are probably agreed that the American family appears to be continuing to move toward a more egalitarian, less stable, and less traditional form.⁶⁵ The birth rate in the 1970s reached its lowest recorded point in American history, and the average age at marriage is relatively high. The divorce rate has been increasing steadily, and a large proportion of men and women are remaining single.⁶⁶ Married women with children account for a large proportion of the increase of women in the labor force.⁶⁷ Current data suggest that these trends are likely to continue.

There is general agreement among demographers that a repetition of the post-World War II Baby Boom is unlikely in the foreseeable future.⁶⁸ "When married women today are asked how many children they expect to have in their lifetime," Glick points out, "those under 25 years old say they believe they will have just about enough for zero population growth."⁶⁹ Some portion of the current low birth rate is due to the increased delay in marriage, attributable to a so-called "marriage squeeze"—that is, women born in a given year during the Baby Boom outnumber men who were born 2 or 3 years earlier and who form the most likely potential marriage partners. This factor presumably will have a diminished influence in the future. However, age at marriage has also increased because college enrollments among women have increased and because of greater occupational opportunities for women. These factors will continue to play a part; and young people who delay marriage, it has been pointed out, may never get married, since alternatives to marriage may prove to be preferable.⁷⁰

The divorce rate in the United States reached a peak immediately after World War II, fell to pre-war levels in the late 1950s, and then resumed its long upward climb. By the middle of the 1970s, it had reached the highest point in its history and showed little evidence of declining. One out of three marriages, it has been estimated,

will be broken by divorce in the coming decade.⁷¹ Increased financial independence of women, families with few or no children, no-fault divorce laws and free legal aid, the vanishing stigma of divorce—all have made breaking the marital bond easier and simpler, and these factors are apt to continue operating in the future.⁷² To the number of families broken by divorce in the coming years may be added what some social scientists refer to as the “uncompleted family unit,” that is, an unmarried mother and her illegitimate children. The illegitimacy rate increased steadily between 1940 and 1970 and then levelled off; and, although now beginning to decline for both whites and blacks, it remains relatively high (see table 3).

Table 3—Illegitimate Birth Rates, 1940 to 1975

Year	Illegitimate birth rates*		
	Total Population	White	Black and other
1940	7.1	3.6	35.6
1950	14.1	6.1	71.2
1960	21.6	9.2	98.3
1970	26.4	13.8	89.9
1975	24.8	12.6	80.4

Source: United States Bureau of the Census, *The Statistical History of the United States From Colonial Times to the Present* (New York: Basic Books, 1976), p. 52.

*Rates are illegitimate live births per 1,000 unmarried women aged 15-44.

In short, the American family has changed greatly since World War II, in terms of the incidence of divorce, the proportion of married women having jobs outside the home, and the proportion of unwed mothers. There is no conclusive evidence, however, that divorce, the employment of the mother outside the home, or the absence of a father figure is a major element in the causation of delinquency and crime.⁷³ It cannot be concluded, therefore, that future changes along these lines will lead to a serious disruption of the socialization process, causing in turn an increase in delinquent or criminal behavior, although it is possible that future research will show such linkages. For example, it has been claimed that studies indicate that the greatest increase of mental depression in the American populace in recent years has been among

young, poor women who are single parents and young, married mothers who work in low-level jobs.⁷⁴ Empirical investigations may show that the stress produced in such situations is significantly related to children's delinquency and later criminal careers. Until such investigations have been made, the consequences of future structural changes in the family remain in doubt. What does appear likely, from the viewpoint of sociological theory, is that changes in the *content* of socialization occurring in the family (such as the emphasis placed on masculine aggressiveness, material accomplishment, and the like) will be at least as influential as changes in the *structure* of the family, but this issue has not yet received much attention in criminology.

The lack of clear findings is disappointing, considering the many years of research that have been devoted to the study of broken homes and delinquency. A major part of the problem, as Nettler has indicated, lies in the fact that the concept of the broken home has remained far from clear. There are as many styles of broken homes as there are of intact ones, and the use of divorce or illegitimacy as an indicator of defective socialization is obviously gross.⁷⁵ In addition, it seems likely that if defective socialization due to broken homes is a causal factor in delinquency and crime, it is simply one of many, and a failure to systematically examine the influence of other variables will inevitably produce inconsistent findings. Future research and policies concerning broken families and criminal behavior clearly will require a major reformulation of basic concepts.

Studies of the family and criminality have focused mainly on the delinquency of the children. But it is quite possible that changes in the American family will be of equal or greater importance for the criminality of the adult members. This may be particularly likely in the case of married women entering the labor force, since there is much evidence suggesting that more equal occupational opportunities for men and women have tended to produce more equal crime rates.

"In few other fields did young women more appropriately deserve the appellation 'fair' than in that of crime," says Freda Adler. "In every period of history and every geographical area, their crime rate has trailed far behind that for men."⁷⁶ But since World War II, she points out, the crime rate for women has increased sharply, which she attributes in large measure to the social movement toward greater equality between the sexes. "There is a tide in the affairs of women as well as men," she argues, "and in the last decade it has been sweeping over the barriers which have protected male prerogatives and eroding the traditional differences

which once nicely defined the gender roles. The phenomenon of female criminality is but one wave in this rising tide of female assertiveness—a wave which has not yet crested and may be seeking its level uncomfortably close to the highwater mark set by male violence.”⁷⁷

Rita Simon, whose work we cited earlier, also analyzes the increase in women’s crime rates; unlike Adler, she emphasizes the different degree of increase in different kinds of crime and is more skeptical concerning the influence of conscious allegiance to sexual equality. National arrest statistics show that the percentage of females among those arrested for serious crimes more than doubled between 1953 and 1970—from 9.40 percent to 19.25 percent.⁷⁸ Virtually all of this increase, however, involves offenses against property. As a consequence, Simon takes issue with the idea that women have been committing crimes of violence at a much higher rate than they used to. “In fact,” she asserts, “the increase in the proportion of arrests of women for serious crimes is due almost wholly to the fact that women seem to be committing more property offenses than they have in the past. Indeed, the percentage of women arrested for crimes of violence shows neither an upward nor a downward trend. Between 1953 and 1972, the percentages fluctuated from a high point in 1956 of 13.51 to a low in 1968 of 10.33. But the picture for property offenses is markedly different. In 1953, about 1 in every 12 persons arrested was a woman. In 1972, 1 in every 4.7 persons arrested was a woman.”⁷⁹

Something of the same picture is to be found with regard to crimes characterized as Type II offenses by the FBI and which include embezzlement and fraud, forgery and counterfeiting, offenses against family and children, narcotic drug laws, and prostitution and commercialized vice. Here, too, the percentage of females among those arrested has increased, but mainly in the first two categories which involve offenses against property.

The arrest data of the FBI suggest that the biggest increases in the rates of property offenses by women have occurred since 1967. Simon indicates that while the women’s liberation movement could have been a factor, an explanation based primarily on a changed female consciousness may be a distortion:

For all the ideological differences and tactical variations that exist within the women’s movement, the demographic characteristics of their membership are extraordinarily homogeneous. In the main, the movement is led by, appeals to, and has as the large majority of its members young, white women who are college educated and whose families are middle and upper class. After they leave the university, most of these

women enter the professions. None of the groups within the movement has made any noticeable dent on the blue-collar female workers, on black women, or on high school-educated housewives. The gulf between these types of nonmovement women and the authors of the Red Stockings Manifesto may be as great as any that those writers envisage between men and women. How likely it is, therefore, that the women's movement will significantly alter the behaviors, the perceptions, the beliefs, and the lifestyles of women already involved in criminal careers is too early to say. But given the characteristics of the women's movement, it is unlikely that it has had a significant impact or that it has made much of an impression on women already in crime.⁸⁰

Changes in the occupational opportunities for women, Simon argues, are probably the major cause of increased criminality of women in recent years. If the occupational roles of men and women become more alike in the future, so too will their crime rates. It is not the women's movement, then, that is the major factor producing more equal crime rates. Rather, it is the fact of more women working outside the home and being exposed to the same social forces that lead to crimes against property by men.⁸¹ Since it appears likely that women's participation in the labor force will become more like that of men's (not only in terms of participation rate, but of type of job and responsibility as well), the crime rate of women can be expected to continue moving upward.

Economic Factors

The idea that economic conditions are a cause of crime is an idea that can be traced far back in antiquity, notes Stephen Schafer in his analysis of theories of criminal behavior. "It engaged the attention of thinkers even before the rise of modern criminology," he points out. "Xenophon, Plato, Aristotle, and the Romans Virgil and Horace all touched upon this subject Hardly any of the thinkers of the cause of criminality omitted poverty or economic conditions from their catalogue of crime factors, and thus an endeavor to present those who have treated this issue would mean to list almost all who treated the problem of crime."⁸² Nonetheless, arguments about the precise role of economic factors in crime causation persist, and the relative importance of such factors is far from resolved.

A part of the difficulty in assessing the influence of economic factors is due to the fact that the problem can be approached from either the individual or the societal level, and stress may be placed

on either static or dynamic characteristics. The result is four different modes of analysis, involving different bodies of empirical data and different theories concerning the nature of the relationship (see figure 1).

Figure 1—Modes of Analysis of Crime and Economic Factors

	Individual Level	Social Level
Static	Criminal Behavior and the Economic Status of the Individual	Crime Rates and Economic Organization
Dynamic	Criminal Behavior and Economic Mobility	Crime Rates and Economic Change

The relationship between the criminal behavior of the individuals and their economic mobility, in terms of variables such as variation in annual income or changes in wealth, has received relatively little empirical attention. More attention has been devoted to temporary shifts in the employment status of an individual, with the general expectation that if a loss of one's job pushes the individual into acute economic need, crimes against property are likely to result. The empirical evidence is limited, however, and does not indicate that there is a strong, consistent correlation between criminal behavior and unemployment.⁸³ Data on the characteristics of prison inmates must always be used with great caution as an indication of what criminals-at-large are like, but here too the evidence does *not* suggest that crime and unemployment are closely linked. During the greater part of the month immediately before being arrested for the offense that led to their present sentence, approximately 17 percent of the prison inmates who had been in the labor force were out of a job — a figure that is perhaps not too different from that of noncriminals in the free community with comparable educational levels and work experiences.⁸⁴

The data with regard to the correlation between crime rates and the ups and downs of economic cycles are no more conclusive.⁸⁵ Thorsten Sellin, summarizing in 1937 the studies that had been made in this area over a period of more than 100 years, could not find evidence of a definite, consistent relationship.⁸⁶ The topic has

received only sporadic attention in subsequent decades but the available evidence continues to support Sellin's conclusion: Crime rates and the business cycle show a weak and inconsistent relationship.⁸⁷ Harvey Brenner has recently argued that there is a strong correlation between crime and economic change in the form of unemployment, but his conclusions are based on aggregate data, rather than data for individuals, and official statistics (such as arrest rates) that are a doubtful index of crime.⁸⁸

The relationship between the static socioeconomic status of an individual and involvement in officially recorded crime has received much more attention from criminologists. Murder, rape, burglary, larceny, and robbery are all far more likely to be committed by individuals from lower economic strata than by those higher on the social scale. As criminologists have long been aware, when other crimes are taken into account (offenses such as white-collar crimes, for example, and many forms of juvenile delinquency) and when the vast quantity of criminal behavior that frequently does *not* reach official attention is also considered (such as employee theft, petty business fraud, and income tax evasion), the relationship between the individual's socioeconomic status and criminal behavior takes on a much different appearance.⁸⁹ The data strongly suggest that, while crimes of violence are most apt to be committed by persons of a lower socioeconomic status, crimes against property are committed quite generally by persons at all socioeconomic levels and may, in fact, be committed most frequently by those in the middle and upper strata. Since crimes against property are far more numerous than crimes against the person, the traditional view of crime as mainly a lower class phenomenon is almost certainly in error.⁹⁰

The mode of analysis—or theoretical viewpoint—that links crime rates to different types of economic structure was central in the work of Willem Bonger. Writing from the perspective of Marxist socialism, Bonger argued that violations of the criminal law are encouraged in a capitalistic society by the unrestrained competition for monetary gain. Money is the primary means of satisfying the individual's desires, and the social environment drives people to obtain money without regard for the needs or rights of others. The solution to the crime problem, said Bonger, is to attack it at its source; i.e., the system of economic production for private profit that destroys man's altruistic spirit. Only socialism, with the means of production held in common and with property distributed according to the maxim "to each according to his need," can establish the social solidarity that will make the motivation of criminal behavior disappear. A residue of crime will remain, it is true, but it

will be the limited activity of pathological individuals, and it will fall within the sphere of the physician rather than the judge.⁹¹

A Marxist view of the causes of crime, centering on the nature of the economic system rather than on differences in the economic status of individuals, has also been a major element in the recent writings of Richard Quinney, Jock Young, Tony Platt, Herman and Julia Schwendinger, and others who subscribe to a conflict interpretation of society.⁹² The criminal law, it is argued, is an instrument designed to serve the interests of a ruling elite, a part of a system of exploitation and oppression enforced by police determined to maintain the status quo. These writers, however, have not developed an explicit, systematic theory of crime causation. In part, it would appear, they believe that development of such a theory would require acceptance of the philosophical assumptions of positivism which are seen as denying man's ability to choose his own future, to act as a voluntary being rather than as an object subject to mechanical forces.⁹³ In part, also, there seems to be a view that studying the cause of crime from a scientific perspective would somehow interfere with the more important task of changing society. Thus, an examination of crime causation would appear to be avoided by those adhering to a Marxist view of crime due to a blending of political and philosophical reasons. Attention is concentrated instead on the class struggle, the defects of capitalism, and the inequities of the administration of criminal justice.

Nonetheless, attempts to explain criminal behavior can be glimpsed occasionally in the writings of those who identify themselves with what is termed a Marxist or a radical approach to criminology. Variations in the occurrence of crime are sometimes attributed to traditions of violence, as other criminologists have argued, or to variations in opportunities to commit crime based on the availability of property. Most generally, however, crime seems to be viewed as a rational act, *i.e.*, as a means of solving problems existing among persons who are at the bottom of the socioeconomic ladder because of the exploitative nature of a capitalistic social order. "Property crime is better understood as a *normal* and conscious attempt to amass property," it is asserted, "than it is understood, for example, as a product of faulty socialization Simply put, a society which is predicated on the unequal right to the accumulation of property *gives rise* to the legal and illegal desire to accumulate property as rapidly as possible."⁹⁴ The question, from this viewpoint, is not why some people commit crimes such as offenses against property while others do not, but why only some types of efforts to obtain property are declared criminal.⁹⁵

The idea that capitalism is the cause of crime and socialism is the cure remains unproven. There has been no systematic comparison of crime rates in socialistic societies and the United States, for example. The socialistic social order envisioned by the radical criminologists, and allegedly with lower crime than the capitalistic society presented as its opposite, has tended to remain a utopian vision—a commitment to eliminating exploitation and oppression, rather than something with a proven causal influence.⁹⁶

In general, then, attempts to link crime to economic factors remain inconclusive, whether the problem is approached at the individual or the societal level, or whether one analyzes the issue within a static or dynamic framework. The clearest and most consistent findings indicate that the economic status of those convicted of crime is lower than that of the population as a whole, but this is largely a matter of the conventional "crimes" (the crimes included in the FBI's Crime Index) that come to the attention of the police and tells us nothing about the possible consequences of changes over time. The lack of better evidence of a correlation between crime and economic factors may be due in part to poor data, the unsolved difficulties in comparing different time periods (or different countries with different social systems), and so on. Even more important is the fact that, even if there is a relationship between crime and economic factors, it is probably not a direct, causal linkage. Indeed, argues Gwynn Nettler, it is questionable to what extent economic factors can be said to cause any particular kind of behavior.⁹⁷ Instead, the crucial thing is the situation or events that may accompany a particular economic status or act as intervening variables, such as the arousal of cupidity, the breakdown of primary groups, a sense of alienation, or the exposure to deviant groups. Since the correlations between economic factors and the intervening or accompanying variables are undoubtedly imperfect, and the latter are imperfectly correlated with crime, the relationships between economic factors and crime are not apt to be strong and consistent. The task of trying to estimate the future impact of economic variables on criminal behavior must be approached with some caution.

If we assume that unemployment and withdrawal from the labor force are positively associated with crime, the arguments of Robert Theobald, Robert Davis, Ben Seligman, and others concerned with the impact of cybernation suggest a host of future difficulties for American society. "During the second half of the nineteenth century it became increasingly clear that in the future productivity and total production would rise so fast that an abundance of goods and services was certain," said Robert Theobald, writing in the mid-

dle of the 1960s.⁹⁸ There was, however, one disturbing problem. " . . . A growing number of experts," Theobald continued, "have concluded that a continuing impact of technological change will make it impossible to provide jobs for all who seek them."⁹⁹ Automation, aided by the computer, would shortly release a flood of economic productivity with a greatly reduced use of human labor.¹⁰⁰

In the latter part of the 1970s, an overwhelming abundance of goods and services no longer appeared as imminent as Theobald and others had envisioned. The energy crisis, the threat of inflation, the constraints of industrial pollution, the possible shortages of a variety of resources, and a growing awareness of the problems of poverty in the third world make any talk of an era of abundance premature if not utopian. But the threat of increasing unemployment, due not to the momentary fluctuations of the economy but to a chronic inability of the industrial nations to create enough jobs to absorb the next generation, was a real one and could be attributed, at least in part, to mechanization and automation.

A forecast of widespread unemployment among young people during the 1960s was based on the realization that the children of the post-World-War-II Baby Boom would be reaching their late teens and entering the labor market. The number of young workers had remained relatively stable during the 1950s, increasing by no more than half a million during the decade. In 1960, 1961, and 1962, the number of youths entering the labor force began to grow sharply, and by 1965 there was approximately a 25 percent increase in the number of 14- to 19-year-olds at work or looking for work. White-collar jobs had also increased much faster than blue-collar jobs since the end of World War II. The result was that young, inexperienced workers, most of them with no more than a high school education, flooded the labor market at a time when many of the jobs traditionally available to such workers were in ever-shorter supply.¹⁰¹

The specter of widespread unemployment failed to materialize in the 1960s. An economic upswing, growing military production, an increase in the size of the Armed Forces, rising college enrollments, and new manpower programs of the Federal Government (spurred by the threat of massive unemployment) helped to avert the crisis. There were high unemployment rates for some groups, it was true—such as young, urban blacks—but the writers who had predicted that great numbers of young people would be looking for work and unable to find it (the major domestic challenge of the sixties, in the words of President Kennedy) were mistaken.¹⁰²

The fact that widespread youth unemployment did not occur in the 1960s does not mean that the threat has vanished. Even though another Baby Boom and consequent huge bulge in the younger age groups of American society seems unlikely, the possibility remains that unemployment among young workers has become a structural malady of modern industrial societies. "Indeed," says one writer, "to a growing number of governments, the issue of youth employment is as French President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing recently put it, the 'No. 1 national priority.'"¹⁰³

Concern over unemployment among the young may be greatly heightened when there is a severe shortage of jobs to fit the expectations of recent college graduates—a problem that is particularly acute in Europe at the present time. In recent years, it has been pointed out, Italy has had far too few suitable jobs for its annual crop of university graduates, and the lack of such jobs "was a key reason that students took to the streets this spring [1977] in flag-waving demonstrations that turned violent in most major cities."¹⁰⁴ A similar problem faces American society and may become increasingly severe. Even more important, however, is the problem of unemployment among the young with a high school education or less. For these persons the shortage of suitable jobs means that many individuals are never able to develop a stable work history and are condemned to an irregular series of temporary, low-paying, menial jobs.

It is possible, then, that we face the prospect of a social order that will be chronically unable to create sufficient places in the world of work for both the most and the least educated.¹⁰⁵ If this is the case, a much stronger correlation between crime and unemployment may develop than has been observed in the past. Large masses of youthful unemployed, at both the bottom and the top of the social structure, and with little hope of ever finding worthwhile work, may provide a more fertile ground for crime in the coming decades than have the unemployed in prior years, including those out of a job in the 1930s.¹⁰⁶

Some writers, of course, have always taken a rather pessimistic view of the American economic system, arguing on Marxist grounds that the inherent defects of capitalism entail an inevitable collapse. In recent years, the threat of pollution and a series of economic jolts have produced other pessimistic outlooks. The modern industrial world, it is said, will have to cease its thoughtless economic expansion, as it encounters the environmental limitations imposed by the supply of natural resources and the capacity of the earth to absorb the effluvia of the industrial process.¹⁰⁷ For some commentators, the coming changes are viewed as cataclysmic. "What we

are seeing today is not simply an economic upheaval," says Alvin Toffler, for example, "but something far deeper, something that cannot be understood within the framework of conventional economics What we are seeing is the general crisis of industrialism—a crisis that transcends the differences between capitalism and Soviet-style communism, a crisis that is simultaneously tearing up our energy base, our value systems, our sense of space and time, our epistemology as well as our economy. What is happening, no more, no less, is the breakdown of industrial civilization on the planet and the first fragmentary appearance of a wholly new and drastically different social order: a super-industrial civilization that will be technological but no longer industrial."¹⁰⁸

Other writers, more inclined to academic caution perhaps, foresee economic strains rather than collapse, changed lifestyles but not a radical transformation. But if the concept of zero economic growth is neither a predetermined future course or an acceptable goal of social planning,¹⁰⁹ there is little question that many writers see a strong possibility of a slower rate of economic growth in America and a change in patterns of consumption. The United States has not generated the world's highest per capita GNP since the early 1950s. The U.S. rate of growth instead has declined close to the bottom of the scale of the leading industrial nations; and in the area of productivity, which determines levels of living in the long run, the United States has been trailing Western Europe and Japan.¹¹⁰

If economic opportunities in the United States no longer expand as they have in the past, we may witness an intensifying competitive struggle for the available economic rewards. American attitudes toward the problems of inequality seem to have been shaped in large measure by the apparently boundless possibilities of the future in which the vicissitudes of the past could be forgotten and the present ignored. It has not been a matter of equal opportunity in a system with a fixed sum of rewards. Rather, in the past the rewards appeared to grow larger, as every prize won seemed to breed a dozen more. If the economy does not continue to expand, however, attitudes toward equal opportunity and social mobility may show a drastic shift.¹¹¹

A policy of zero growth is unlikely, argues Rudolph Klein, but a muddled, half-conscious drift toward a much reduced growth is not at all improbable. A society of this type," he asserts, "would be introvert rather than extrovert, traditional rather than innovative. Whether it had settled for an egalitarian distribution of wealth or for the perpetuation of inequalities, it would be resistant to change, stressing social control as the inevitable counterpart of social sta-

bility. There would be little social mobility, since this tends to be a product of economic growth. There might well evolve a gerontocracy with power going hand in hand with seniority The only frontiers that would be open for exploration would be those of artistic or spiritual activity."¹² And, it might be added, the frontier of crime — for if society grows increasingly rigid, those at the bottom of the social ladder may become increasingly disillusioned and embittered.

It is possible, of course, that the economy will move in the direction of centralized control and planning, including government ownership of some portions of industrial production. In the aftermath of the demise of the War on Poverty and of the loss of faith in large-scale Federal intervention to solve domestic social problems, a deliberate governmental move in the direction of greater economic equality does not seem very likely. Nor does there seem to be much prospect that the proportion of those living in poverty will be greatly reduced by an increase in general economic well-being. (The percent of persons below the poverty level was nearly cut in half in the 1960s, dropping to about 11 or 12 percent in 1969, but did not change significantly in the 1970s.)¹³ Insofar as the incidence of crime is linked to poverty, then, whether by economic need, a sense of alienation, a subculture of violence, or the disorganization of primary groups, there is little evidence to suggest that crime will be greatly reduced because of dramatic alterations in the plight of the poor.

A number of writers have predicted that the American economic structure will continue to move further and further away from laissez-faire capitalism. Peter Drucker, for example, argues that a species of socialism is already emerging in the United States. "If 'socialism' is defined as 'ownership of the means of production by the workers—and this is the orthodox and only rigorous definition,' " he argues, "then the United States is the first truly 'socialist' country. American workers, through their pension funds, now own some 35 percent of the common shares of American business, and by 1985 they will own 50 to 60 percent."¹⁴ According to Drucker, a larger section of the American economy is presently owned by the American workers than Allende brought under government ownership in Chile, than Castro's Cuba has nationalized, or than has been nationalized in Hungary or Poland. Other writers foresee not "ownership by the workers," but far greater control of the economy by the State as American society struggles to keep its place in a new international economic system.

Pension socialism has little to do with the socialism that most social commentators have in mind. More centralized planning and

coordination of economic activity need not bring an end to the competition and profit motive that some writers in criminology have seen as important factors in the causation of crime. John Kenneth Galbraith, for example, detects strong pressures on the United States to move in the direction of a planned economy—for reasons of efficiency—and yet is not notably inclined to foresee a diminution of the competitive spirit and profit motive, or a future U.S. society characterized by heightened regard for the needs and welfare of fellow citizens.¹¹⁵ If the degree of social solidarity due to the nature of the economic order is in fact related to the crime rate, the changes in the structure of the American economy predicted by Drucker and Galbraith are not encouraging.

In summary, the possible relationships between crime and economic factors have been analyzed in the literature of criminology at the individual and the societal level, in cross-section, in terms of static characteristics, and in terms of changes over time. The findings have often been inconsistent and uncertain, yet few would doubt the important, if indirect, influence of such factors in the causation of criminal behavior. If existing theories about the role of economic factors are accepted, few of the predictions about economic developments in the coming decades offer much ground for expecting a major drop in the crime rate. In general, the economic forecasts tend to be on the pessimistic side. They may, of course, be wrong. Herman Kahn and his associates, for example, declare “that many well-intentioned people are being distracted from mankind’s real future problems and possibilities by issues that appear central today but are in fact largely temporal, peripheral, or badly formulated.” The dominant issues of today, such as population, economic growth, energy, raw materials, and pollution, are basically solvable, they argue, and we can look forward to a time of world prosperity.¹¹⁶ It is worth noting that many writers who take an optimistic view of the economic future frequently stress technological advances and pay relatively little attention to the political and social context of economic organization.¹¹⁷ They thus tend to slight those factors that are likely to lead to economic frustration for a large segment of the population and an increase in criminal behavior.

Education

Numerous studies have shown a negative correlation between years of schooling, on the one hand, and crime and delinquency on the other.¹¹⁸ The problem has been to demonstrate why such a

correlation exists. Few writers have claimed that the likelihood of crime and delinquency decreases with educational level because of a change in the individual's values and attitudes induced by the school. Instead, years of schooling (or dropping back in school or dropping out of school) have generally been viewed by criminologists as playing a causative role due to something other than what is or is not learned.

For Albert Cohen, failure in school is seen as a likely fate for lower class children struggling to succeed in a school system dominated by middle-class standards and middle-class teachers. Unable to succeed within the area of legitimate achievement marked out by the school system, the lower class child tries to find an alternative path to success that lies close at hand, namely, achievement in terms of the value system of the delinquent gang with its emphasis on theft and violence.¹¹⁹ For other writers, the association between failure in school or between lack of schooling and crime is attributed not to the school experience itself but to antecedent factors such as poverty, "poor home conditions," and the like. Low social status is the crucial factor, in theory, that causes both poor performance in the educational system and involvement in patterns of law violation.¹²⁰

For still other writers, the commonly observed link between delinquency and low levels of schooling is best explained by the fact that failure in school and truancy are apt to mean that the child is more exposed to delinquency behavior patterns.¹²¹ A youth learns to be delinquent, it is argued, just as he or she learns any other pattern of behavior. If the youth is not educated in the school, he or she will be educated in the street. All of these theoretical interpretations probably have some degree of validity, and it can be expected that low levels of schooling and criminal or delinquent behavior will continue to be associated in the future.

It is important to remember that in Sutherland's theory of differential association—which has long served as one of the major explanations of criminal and delinquent behavior in American criminology—the exposure to *conforming* behavior, along with the underlying norms and attitudes, is no less important than exposure to patterns of criminal or delinquent behavior and their supporting norms and attitudes. Indeed, it is the ratio between the two, according to Sutherland, that determines whether criminal behavior will occur.¹²² Sutherland's point appears to be particularly important in trying to assess the impact of changes in the level of schooling in the decades to come. For many individuals in American society, exposure to the demands for conformity occurs in a series of stages in which the influence on one set of social controls


is first supplemented and then supplanted by another. The control of the family is gradually replaced by the control of peers and agencies of socialization, such as the school. These, in turn, are replaced by the demands of marriage, the work group, and the local community as the individual moves into adult roles. A crucial point lies at the junction between the youth's world of the school and the family of orientation, on the one hand, and the adult's world of full-time work and the family of procreation on the other. This junction has tended to occur later and later in the life cycle, as many individuals go through longer periods of schooling and of delayed entry into the full-time labor force. Approximately 15 percent of the population 18 to 24 years old in the United States was enrolled in school in 1950. Twenty years later, 30 percent of this group was in school, and there appears to be little reason to expect that this percentage will be found to have diminished when the 1980 census returns are in.¹²³

For those pursuing education beyond the secondary level, the organized life of the school both in and out of the classroom continues to expose the majority of students to patterns of more or less conventional or conforming behavior, and these undoubtedly outweigh the exposure to deviant or "experimental" behavior that also occurs for some students. For the large number of individuals who do *not* go to college, there has come to exist a gap between the end of schooling and the imposition of adult responsibilities and pressures. The lack of social control exercised by conventional society in this period is associated with relatively high rates of criminal behavior. The fact, then, that the arrest rate begins to rise sharply at puberty, reaches a high plateau from about 16 to 18 years of age, and steadily declines thereafter (see figure 2) need not be attributed solely to a rise and fall in youthful energy, a process of psychological maturing, and the like. It seems at least equally likely that a period of intensified criminal activity in the late teens is due in part to the temporary disappearance of conventional mechanisms of social control for a large number of individuals who have finished their schooling but have not yet been absorbed into the adult social structure.

If this explanation is valid, an increase in the proportion of persons aged 18 to 24 who receive postsecondary education could lead to a reduction in crime. It is true, of course, that the crime rate increased sharply in the 1960s, while school enrollments for those aged 18 to 24 were also increasing. However, those *not* in college in the 18 to 24 age group increased by some 46 percent in the decade and may have contributed heavily to the rising crime rate.

Figure 2.—AGE AND ARREST per 100,000, 1975*

*Source: The data for age at arrest are from U.S. Department of Justice, *Uniform Crime Reports* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976), pp. 188-189. The relative size of the various age groups for the total U.S. population was obtained from Bureau of the Census, *Current Population Reports, Population Estimates and Projections* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975), p. 67. The percentages thus obtained were applied to the population covered by the Uniform Crime Reports, for the calculation of age specific arrest rates.



In the decades ahead, the 18 to 24 age group will decrease in both relative and absolute size. An increase in school enrollment in this group will therefore be more apt to show an influence on the crime rate. Although the proportion of those completing a 4-year college program does not appear likely to show a large increase in the decades to come, changes in the content of higher education, particularly in the area of vocational training at the community college level, could make a significant difference in postsecondary enrollments.¹²⁴ In any event, projections of the U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare show a 48 percent increase in the student population in 2-year institutions by 1985, and this may have a significant impact on the crime rate, even though a part of the increase will involve students 22 years of age and older.¹²⁵

It is also possible that the difference in the crime rates of those with and without postsecondary schooling will become more pronounced in the future. To the extent that a college education is linked to getting a job with decent pay and some hope of advancement, the plight of those without such an education will probably grow worse. For, to repeat a point made earlier, the proportion of jobs in the labor market with low skills and demanding little or nothing in the way of technical training has declined markedly since World War II. These are the jobs that traditionally have been filled by those with little schooling. This may reflect an excessive emphasis on academic credentials, as some have argued.¹²⁶ Nonetheless, as the technology of modern society becomes more complex, it can be expected that the demand for those with relatively low education will continue to decrease and that they will be forced into dead-end, low-paying jobs to an increasing extent—if, indeed, they can find any jobs at all. There thus appears to be good reason to expect that crime will increase among those with little schooling, due to frustration and alienation caused by diminishing job opportunities.

Values

The role of values in social behavior has long been a major element in sociological explanations of human behavior, although the concept is frequently left undefined, and much depends on inference rather than empirical observation. Here we follow Robin Williams' lead and define values as relatively abstract, emotionally laden judgments of what is good or bad, desirable or undesirable, that provide the criteria for the selection of more concrete and specific ends and for the evaluation of the actions of self and others.¹²⁷

Explanations of behavior using the concept of values sometimes verge on the tautological, since the underlying values supposedly acting as a cause are occasionally little more than a renaming of the behavior to be explained (*i.e.*, aggressive behavior is caused by the value placed on aggression).¹²⁸ Furthermore, as Dennis Wrong has pointed out, sociologists have been inclined to take a "cookie-cutter" view of man and to see the individual's values as little more than a reflection of society or an unvarying product of socialization, ignoring the extent to which people have an important, if limited, freedom of choice that is influenced by their own particular value structure.¹²⁹ Nevertheless, the concept of values has proven to be invaluable in the attempt to understand social behavior, including crime and delinquency, and possible changes in the role of the American value system warrant attention.

In the first decades of this century, a concern with the role of values in the causation of criminal behavior was likely to center on the influence of religion. Religious institutions inculcated "good" values, it was thought, such as altruism or Christian forbearance, and "good" values steered the individual away from a life of delinquency and crime.¹³⁰ As American sociology moved away from the rather naive moral earnestness of its formative years, the interest in the influence of religion on crime and delinquency diminished sharply. The role of a variety of values to be found in American culture—rather than simply those supposedly embedded in religious doctrine—emerged as the focus of concern.¹³¹

First, it is argued that the failure to inculcate conventional values, such as the worth of work or the willingness to defer gratification, is traceable to broken families or inadequate parental discipline and is a major cause of crime. Second, attention has centered on the extent to which crime can be attributed to exposure to the values of deviant subcultures, such as aggressiveness or a disdain for property, where breaking the law is an admired activity or a part of the individual's role. And third, crime has been seen not as the product of a lack of socialization in terms of conventional values or an exposure to the values of deviant subcultures, but as an expression of what is approved and admired by society. A large share of criminal behavior, particularly property crime, is viewed as an extension of the conventional American emphasis on getting ahead, material success, and self-aggrandizement. The behavior may be illegal, but the underlying values are an accepted part of American life.

We have touched on these themes in earlier pages in discussions of the breakdown of conventional agencies of socialization, such as the family, the emergence of a subculture of violence, and the

frustrations of those at the bottom of the socioeconomic ladder. Two questions warrant further discussion. If much crime and delinquency can be attributed to exposure to the values of deviant subcultures, what is the likelihood that the influence of such groups will increase, remain the same, or decrease in the future? And if crime and delinquency are often the result not of inadequate socialization or deviant socialization but of an "anything-for-a-buck" attitude flowing from the high value attached to material success, will the pattern change or remain the same in years to come?

Unfortunately, despite the attention devoted to deviant subcultures in the sociological literature, much of the work has been descriptive rather than analytical, limited in time and space, and confined to a relatively small range of crime and delinquency. A general theory of deviant subcultures—conceptually sophisticated and tested by empirical research—has not yet emerged, and thus the social conditions that are likely to lead to changes in the size, number, and influence of deviant subcultures and their underlying values cannot be stated with any certainty.¹³² Urban anonymity; a wide variety of social cleavages based on factors such as age, class, and race; a narrow conception of what is acceptable as defined by those dominant in society; important functional ties between the conventional world and deviant groups—all may foster the growth of deviant subcultures, and all may change in the future. So, too, may a "failure of nerve," as some have argued, a loss of faith of those in power, creating a moral ambivalence that undermines the legitimacy of conventional society and opens the way for the flowering of new cults and new philosophies.¹³³ Much work remains to be done before changes in the patterns of criminal and delinquent behavior based on the acceptance of deviant subcultural values can be predicted with any confidence. One important line of research would certainly appear to be an investigation of the social conditions that produce an ebb and flow in the formation of juvenile gangs marked by deviant values, and crosscultural comparisons would be invaluable in such an effort.

In recent decades, the idea that crime and delinquency may flow from a commitment to conventional social values, rather than from inadequate socialization or the influence of deviant subcultures, has received greatest attention in Merton's theory of anomie. Both Sutherland and Taft long ago argued that values embedded in American culture encourage cutthroat competition in the pursuit of material achievement, pushing people into the realm of criminality.¹³⁴ Other writers have advanced much the same claim, but it was Merton's essay on social structure and anomie that systematically developed the idea and explored its implications.¹³⁵

Society, Merton argued, is composed of culture and social structure. The former consists of the values and norms establishing the goals that individuals pursue and the boundaries of socially acceptable means. Social structure is made up of the organized set of social relationships in which the members of society play their various roles. And it is a peculiar feature of American society, Merton claimed, that the value of success pervades the culture, placing great emphasis on economic affluence and social mobility for all, while at the same time the chances of being successful are limited for many by reason of their location in the social structure. The result is a chronic, "built-in" disjunction between the goals stressed by society and the means for reaching them. Failure, for a large number of people, is inevitable and systematic, and, as a consequence, there is steady, strong pressure toward deviant behavior, including crime. The normative restraints are eroded and replaced by anomie or a situation of normlessness.

Merton's analysis of anomie has been much debated, but there is little question that his work is one of the most influential interpretations of deviance in American sociology and has had a profound effect on criminology as well.¹³⁶ If we assume that much criminal behavior (particularly crimes against property, which form the great bulk of all crime) is rooted in the systemic disjunction between the value placed on material success and the means available for its achievement, does it appear likely that the value component will change in the future?

Some writers would probably argue that the theme of success is so central to the American ethos that any decrease in emphasis is highly unlikely. High levels of frustration and high crime rates can be expected to persist in the future, as the desire for mobility continues to outrun available means. There are other writers who argue that the aggressive pursuit of material achievement is diminishing in the United States, reflecting the social upheavals of the 1960s. As the youth of the sixties grow up and take their place in society, they can be expected to introduce a new element into the American value system—less materialism, less striving, and less readiness to sacrifice all other values to unlimited consumption.

There are, in fact, some signs that the American value system is changing, that monetary success is no longer quite the dominant goal portrayed in the theory of anomie. Yankelovich, for example, has found that, in the last few years, increasing percentages of both college and noncollege youth say they would welcome less emphasis on money.¹³⁷ Today's young people, he argues, still want to be rewarded with a good living, economic security, a nice place to live, and a good education for their kids. But these

goals are subordinated to a growing desire for self-fulfillment and personal satisfaction in terms of psychic rewards that is far removed from a goal of material achievement at any cost. Indeed, the major problem he foresees is not the failure to fulfill excessive material ambitions but the inability—particularly on the part of those without a college education—to satisfy reasonable desires for meaningful work, community participation, and a sense of autonomy.

Value systems are not immutable, of course, and it is possible that the emphasis on monetary success has diminished in the United States in recent years. The ecology movement, the advocacy of zero economic growth, the enthusiasm for a “small-is-beautiful” perspective—all suggest that material achievement is indeed no longer as widely accepted as it used to be. It is to be remembered, however, that these are largely middle-class enthusiasms, and they have their roots in the relatively affluent sixties. If the economy should fall into a period of long decline, which we discussed earlier, if America enters an era of diminishing resources and shrinking opportunities, the picture is likely to change markedly. The theme of success may be in fact transformed, not in the direction of a growing allegiance to modest achievements sensibly integrated with less material ends, but in the direction of a “root-hog-or-die” philosophy. Getting ahead may be replaced by staying even—in an increasingly harsh competitive struggle with economic survival as the overriding goal. The anomic character of American life, with its attendant strain toward deviance including various forms of criminality, would grow worse rather than better.

CHAPTER 3

Unconventional Crime

In the preceding pages, we have been concerned mainly with crimes that come to the attention of the police and are officially recorded in the *Uniform Crime Reports* of the FBI. These offenses, which include murder, assault, robbery, burglary, rape, and theft, are dominant in most public discussions of the crime problem in the United States and have long been the focus for much of the theory and research in criminology. It is clear, however, that these "conventional crimes" are by no means the whole of the crime problem and that if we are to sketch a picture of the possibilities of crime in the future, we must explore other types of crime as well. White-collar crime and political crime, in particular, warrant attention.

White-Collar Crime

The concept of white-collar crime was first introduced by Edwin Sutherland in 1939, in his presidential address to the American Sociological Association, and greatly broadened the horizons of criminological thought.¹³⁸ Businessmen, Sutherland argued, frequently committed criminal acts for the benefit of the corporation (such as price fixing and patent infringement) during the regular course of their occupational duties. These crimes often go undetected, unreported, or unpunished. If this form of criminal behavior is taken into account, the stereotypical view of crime as a lower class phenomenon needs to be altered drastically, as well as the view that crime is rooted in individual pathologies or psychological abnormalities.¹³⁹

Sutherland's discussion of white-collar crime is frequently cited in the literature of American criminology, and his arguments have undoubtedly played a major part in changing peoples' views of the nature of the criminal and changing his location in the social structure. What is perhaps most striking is how little has been done in the decades following the publication of Sutherland's ideas—either in terms of theory building or research—to explain

why white-collar crime occurs, the various forms that it takes, how it changes over time, or its impact on society. With a few exceptions, to be found in the work of writers such as Newman, Clinard, Lane, Harding, Ball, and Geis, white-collar crime has tended to remain an area of behavior commonly acknowledged but seldom explored.¹⁴⁰

The failure of American criminology to build on Sutherland's work might be attributed to a reluctance on the part of academic criminologists to offend those in positions of power and wealth, or to the sheer difficulty of undertaking research in an area which often calls for the combined skills of a social scientist, accountant, lawyer, and investigative reporter. But perhaps even more important has been the fact that in the boom years of the 1950s and early 1960s, the problem of "big business" (a central concern of Sutherland's) did not appear as threatening as it had in the days of muckraking and the Great Depression. Widespread concern about the misbehavior of American business did not appear again until the end of the 1960s, with the growing fears of industrial pollution and the rise of consumerism.¹⁴¹

The criminal behavior of the business corporation is unquestionably a serious issue, since it can cause huge financial losses to the public and stockholders, and possibly lower social morale and interpersonal trust, as Sutherland and subsequent writers have claimed. However, the conditions under which such behavior is likely to increase, decrease, or change its form remain largely unknown.¹⁴²

It can be hypothesized that the size of corporations plays a part. Even though small firms in a marginal economic position are under much pressure to cut corners, the likelihood of white-collar crime is perhaps greatest in giant corporations. The arrogance of great power, the problems of maintaining economic dominance, the political influence possessed by large-scale enterprises appear to enhance the possibility of illegal behavior. A growth in number of giant business corporations in the United States could thus lead to an increase in corporate violations of the criminal law.

Various other factors may also be important. The extent to which the products of competing firms are nearly identical can be a factor encouraging price fixing.¹⁴³ The growing complexity of the technology of economic activity may encourage corruption, as consumers find themselves less and less able to judge the quality of the product.¹⁴⁴ The enlarged role of government spending will probably be significant in areas such as military procurement for public construction at the local level, since the awarding of government contracts has long been an area in which bribery and other

illegal practices flourish.¹⁴⁵ The growing importance of taxation as a factor shaping the profits and the policies of business enterprise, along with the complexities and ambiguities inherent in the administration of the rules of the Internal Revenue Service, suggests that the pressures toward tax fraud are likely to grow greater rather than less. The ever-greater number of government regulations, ranging from the setting of rates to the prohibition of discrimination, is apt to set the stage for an increase in violations of the law. And as American corporations sprawl across national boundaries, doing business in parts of the world where bribery is not only customary but quasi-respectable, an erosion of ethical standards in domestic operations may be a consequence.

A number of criminologists have extended the concept of white-collar crime beyond the scope of Sutherland's original intention. Where Sutherland primarily used the term for the criminal acts performed by corporate officials in the course of their occupational duties and aimed at the benefit of the corporation (price fixing, for example), later writers have applied the term to property offenses committed by white-collar workers for their personal advantage (as in the case of embezzlement, employee theft, and so on). This extended usage has been a source of some confusion, and another term for the criminal behavior of white-collar workers who commit crimes for their own economic benefit is needed. Clinard and Quinney have suggested the label "occupational criminal behavior" for "offenses committed by individuals in the course of their occupations and the offenses of employees against their employers,"¹⁴⁶ but their definition would include property crimes committed by both white- and blue-collar workers. It would be useful, perhaps, if criminology adopted the concept of property offenses committed by members of the middle class or white-collar class and recognized two major subdivisions: (1) corporate crimes, which would be close to Sutherland's original concept of white-collar crime; and (2) property offenses committed by white-collar workers for personal advantage. (The latter, presumably, would show some interesting similarities and differences when compared with property offenses committed by blue-collar workers). Our purpose here is not to elaborate a definition but simply to point to an important form of criminal behavior, namely the property crimes of middle-class or white-collar workers that are committed for personal rather than organizational gain.

As Smigel, Mannheim, and others have indicated, acts of theft committed against the large impersonal bureaucratic organization are viewed as less reprehensible by many persons than are acts of theft committed against an individual, well-defined owner.¹⁴⁷

Crimes against property thus appear to be influenced strongly by people's perception of property and ownership. "Property," argued Max Lerner, "is not a simple or single right. It has become a property complex—a tangle of ideas, emotions, and attitudes as well as of legal and economic practices. As such, it has been drastically transformed in the era of Big Technology and the corporate empire."¹⁴⁸ Respect for private property has greatly diminished as the connection between ownership and individual effort has become less and less clear in a world of industrial enterprise.

The average economic loss involved in crimes committed by white-collar workers may be small, but the aggregate loss is great. In 1960, Norman Jaspán estimated that white-collar employees at all levels were stealing about \$4 million in cash and property each working day, and that during the year about \$5 billion would be paid in kickbacks and bribes.¹⁴⁹ In 1967, the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice hazarded a guess, based on data supplied by the Super Market Institute, that in the grocery industry the losses due to employee theft and shoplifting were about the same as the industry's net profit after taxes.¹⁵⁰ In 1974, the Chamber of Commerce of the United States claimed that theft by white-collar workers amounted to \$40 billion per year.¹⁵¹ Insofar as their crimes are rooted in a diminished sense of wrongdoing when "the owner" is a dimly seen abstraction, the continued growth of complex large-scale enterprises can be expected to increase the incidence of such behavior.¹⁵²

The problem of crimes against property committed by white-collar workers will be complicated by the more extensive use of computer technology, which will allow forms of theft that are difficult to detect and that may involve sums of money far greater than the embezzlements and swindles encountered in the past.¹⁵³ Even more important, however, is the growth of what Charles Reich has termed "the new property"—the claim to goods and services furnished through Federal, State, and local political structures. "The valuables which derive from relationships to government are of many kinds," says Reich. "Some primarily concern individuals; others flow to business and organizations. Some are obvious forms of wealth, such as direct payments of money, while others, like licenses and franchises, are indirectly valuable."¹⁵⁴ This greatly increased amount of intangible property, in the form of monetary benefits flowing from the government or government-protected rights to earn such benefits, has created a large number of situations where the concept of "owner" has almost vanished. The property that is being stolen may be fairly clear, in some cases, such as an illegitimate claim for a tax refund; in other cases, the property

in question may be less easy to comprehend, such as a professional license wrongfully obtained, although the economic gain to the wrongdoer is plain enough. In either event, conventional ideas about property owners have little relevance, stealing has become an abstract act with the sense of a real victim much diminished and the chances of theft among members of the middle class much enlarged. Since the "new property" appears likely to be an increasingly important aspect of American life in the future, the incidence of property offenses among white-collar workers will probably increase.

Political Crime

The social and political traumas of the 1960s and 1970s helped to create a growing interest in political crime—a type of criminal behavior that has received limited attention from criminology in the past. The concept of political crime is difficult to pin down precisely, but it seems clear that it must center on the political character of the lawbreaker's goals,¹⁵⁵ and would include the following categories: (1) acts prohibited by the criminal law that are undertaken in an attempt to change the existing structure of political power; (2) illegal efforts to seize or maintain political power, as in a coup d'état or the wrongful imprisonment of political opponents; (3) refusals to obey the law on the basis of political or ideological beliefs; and (4) either failure to enforce the law or discriminatory enforcement of the law for political ends, as in the case of political favoritism and political harassment.¹⁵⁶

Since political crime would appear to be a topic of great theoretical importance, it is curious that the area has remained relatively neglected until the last decade. "Although political crime is the oldest and perhaps most recurring criminal phenomenon of history," notes Stephen Schafer, "and because of its impact by all means the most important, it has been largely ignored in criminological studies and has been the subject of little research or analysis. It is almost as if it were considered a kind of criminological satellite, some strange body of law violation revolving around the body of ordinary crimes."¹⁵⁷ Today, many criminologists have come to view political crime as lying near the center of the discipline rather than the periphery, and the question of the future of political crime is no less important than the future of the crimes included in the *Uniform Crime Index* of the FBI.

Illegal Dissent

In examining illegal political dissent in the United States in recent years, one of the most striking facts is the extent to which opposition to the existing political system—and the reactions of society—has taken on symbolic form. “Ordinary” crimes are frequently invested with political meaning and used as a dramatic means of expressing political dissent. At the same time, those expressing political dissent are often treated as “ordinary” criminals, with the enforcement of the criminal law used as a means of striking back at those who oppose the government and its politics. Thus, for example, behavior ranging from vandalism to random acts of physical violence may be defined by individuals as expressions of a political ideology in conflict with the ideology embedded in law; and political dissenters may be prosecuted for loitering, driving without a taillight, trespassing, violating fire ordinances, and so on. In both cases, what can be called “ordinary” crime has become “politicized.” The ideological quality of these “politicized” acts, in which the underlying meaning may not be immediately obvious, makes the analysis of political crime especially complex, and any attempt to come to grips with the behavior is certain to fail, if the larger political context is not taken into account.

In general, in recent years, the person expressing political dissent in an illegal form, such as urging others to commit acts of violence, has been seen by criminologists as very different from the run-of-the-mill offender. Clinard and Quinney, for example, argue that political criminals usually do not view themselves as criminals. The goals of these offenders, they contend, “are not personal, but are deemed desirable for the larger society. Their actions are usually public rather than private. The political offender regards his behavior as important for a larger purpose. Political offenders carry on their activities in pursuit of an idea.”¹⁵⁸

Other writers have come to a similar conclusion, viewing the political rebel as a person committed to an unselfish hope for a better world, believing in a new social order and not mere anarchy, and deliberately, rationally choosing political rebellion as an appropriate means, even when his or her behavior falls into the category of criminal behavior. The person’s actions, that is to say, are apt to be seen as matching the model of *nonconforming* rather than *aberrant* behavior, as analyzed by Robert Merton in an effort to distinguish two major modes of deviance. The nonconformist, according to Merton, publicly announces his deviance, challenges the legitimacy of the accepted norms, wishes to change the norms

he violates, acts for disinterested purposes, and claims to be conforming to the deepest values of the society.¹⁵⁹ The political rebel is thus distinguished from the aberrant who makes no pretense of following a social ideal.

Portrayals of political rebels are frequently somewhat romanticized. "Trashing the establishment" is frequently wanton mischief rather than a revolutionary gesture, just as "ripping off the establishment," in the form of stealing from the university store on the part of middle-class students; it is more apt to be undertaken for material motives than because of political beliefs. Nevertheless, it is important to recognize that much illegal political dissent can be categorized as principled deviance rather than as a compulsive symptom of some underlying pathology. The traumas of childhood, personality defects, the breakdown of primary groups—all may be less important than the individual's perception of the faults of society and a consciously chosen strategy of involvement in social action.

The argument that the causes of violent confrontations, the destruction of property, and other forms of illegal political dissent are to be found in the individual's past (a permissive upbringing, an unresolved oedipal complex, the experience of personal frustration, and the like), can be viewed as a scientific hypothesis that can be tested. Such an argument can also be seen as having the effect, perhaps deliberate, of discrediting political dissent, or reducing it to the status of unreasoned action rooted in personal problems rather than an acute awareness of social injustice. It is understandable, then, that recent writing in criminological theory—much of which has been inclined to take a liberal or a radical viewpoint—has failed to produce much discussion of the causes of political crime in terms of individual differences.¹⁶⁰ It is also true—and somewhat surprising—that there has been little effort in the recent writings in criminology to uncover the causes of what is called political crime, in terms of social structure or historical change. Again, as in the case of white-collar crime, we are confronted with a form of criminal behavior that has become of greatly increased concern in recent years but which has yet to generate a large body of theory and the testing of ideas in criminology. Analysis in the field has tended to remain at the level of description and post hoc interpretation.

Efforts to understand the increase of political crime in the United States in the 1960s and 1970s, in the form of bombings, arson, violent confrontations, riots, vandalism, the seizure of property, and so on, are handicapped by many unresolved questions. What was the causal role of the Vietnam war? The rage

elicited by that conflict was clearly of great importance and yet is by no means the whole story, as is evident by a parallel outbreak of violent political dissent in Europe that also featured a variety of attacks on the status quo.¹⁶¹ Was there a "revolution of expectations," as some have claimed, raising the hopes of the poor and members of minority groups far beyond what American society was prepared to deliver and resulting in increasing frustration that inevitably burst out in political protest outside the legitimate channels?¹⁶² To what extent was violent protest against the authority of the States in the 1960s and 1970s a product of participation in a counterculture created by a unique change in the age structure? Did the growth of political protest, both legal and illegal, depend solely on the beliefs and attitudes of the powerless who became increasingly disenchanted with the promises of American life, or did it depend, at least in part, on the uncertainties and ambivalence of those in power?

Clear answers are lacking—and, indeed, these may not be the right questions. Nevertheless, one can argue that although the political violence of the 1960s and early 1970s has decreased greatly, it can return with equal or greater force in coming decades, contingent on a number of possible events. First, another military conflict, such as the Vietnam War (a war, let us say, in a relatively unknown area, undertaken for objectives viewed as obscure or illegitimate in the eyes of a large segment of the population, and with an enemy claiming to fight in the name of liberation or national defense), would almost certainly elicit a widespread anger that is likely to take the form of violent opposition. The legacy of cynicism and distrust of the government left by the conflict in Vietnam will undoubtedly influence public reactions to military interventions on the part of the United States for many years to come. Second, a prolonged economic depression appears to be the kind of event likely to set off political protest that would escape the boundaries of legal agitation for remedies and change. Skepticism concerning the fairness of the system of stratification, great distrust of the machinations of big business, a large number of families that recently have managed to rise just above the poverty level—all set the stage for a particularly strong reaction to a major downturn of the economy. A serious depression is no longer likely to be accepted as an inevitable phase of the business cycle that must be endured or, even more important, as a misfortune that is equally shared. The demand for a quick solution is not likely to be constrained by the forms of conventional political action.

A loss of faith in the actions of government and a suspicion that the social system is somehow "rigged" and that inequalities

in the distribution of wealth and power cannot be justified may be a general problem for countries in a late phase of capitalist development, as Jurgen Habermas has claimed, and lead to alienation and "a withdrawal of consent."¹⁶³ Alternatively, it is possible that the present existence of a widespread feeling of distrust is a phenomenon that will gradually dissipate, to be replaced eventually by a more positive mode. In either event, in the immediate future, a high degree of alienation with regard to the forms and policies of government seems likely to continue as an important part of the American scene and to create an environment in which the chances of political extremism are increased.

There are other disasters that are possible—a meltdown in a nuclear plant, for example—that would almost certainly trigger violent confrontations between public authorities and organized groups of protestors. The crucial point is not simply that there are possible events that would create a crisis, but that reactions to such events have an increased likelihood of eliciting political dissent that flows into illegal channels, where protest takes on a highly visible, dramatic form. The present quiescence in violent protest, in other words, is perhaps best viewed as the eye of the hurricane rather than a calm that comes with the final passage of a storm.¹⁶⁴ The powerful example of the confrontations of the late 1960s, the radicalism that is far from vanished even though now somewhat underground, the unresolved problems of poverty and racism that continue to breed bitterness and resentment—all make it likely that political protest in the immediate future will not remain confined to orderly disagreement.

The future of political crime, of course, is not only a matter of the extent to which large numbers of an alienated public become willing to violate the law in order to express dissent. Small groups of terrorists, with little public support, can create large-scale disturbances and inflict serious harms, such as assassinations, kidnappings, hijackings, and bombings, with the intention of winning publicity for a political cause. All may grow more numerous in the future. Terrorist groups operating in recent years in the United States (some consisting of no more than a few dozen members) include the Armed Forces of National Liberation and the Armed Revolutionary Commandos for Independence, both advocates of Puerto Rican independence; the New World Liberation Front, believed to be an offspring of the Symbionese Liberation Army which kidnapped Patty Hearst; the Weather Underground, now reportedly divided over the issue of whether to tone down its radical ideology in the hope of winning white working-class support; and the Pragmatists, consisting of Cuban refugees. In addition,

there are other factions that appear briefly, with relatively arcane demands, and then disappear, such as the Hanaji Moslem sect and the Croatian nationalists.¹⁶⁵

For a number of observers, it appears likely that terrorist groups outside the United States will increasingly use the United States as a stage. Terrorism, notes one writer, "has enormous visceral impact—and, by extension, political influence. The dramatic, impersonal nature of most terrorist attacks, the frequency choice of civilian targets and the willingness to export violence to any place where the publicity pay off is apt to be great, make the terrorist's deeds especially chilling."¹⁶⁶ Terrorism will become more frequent, it is claimed, with greater sophistication in targeting, execution, and weaponry. The growth of separatist and revolutionary movements around the world (whose members often find the expression of dissent within their own country too risky, as in the case of the opponents of the Shah of Iran), the spread of television and communications satellites that make it easier to achieve instant, worldwide attention, and the development of new weapons, such as portable guided missiles that can give a small group immense destructive power, all play a role.¹⁶⁷

The last point appears particularly threatening to many observers, and the California Office of Emergency Services has sent a 30-page handbook outlining procedures for dealing with the threat of nuclear blackmail to every city and police agency in the State.¹⁶⁸

According to local authorities in Los Angeles, the use of a nuclear bomb was recently a threat in an attempt to extort a large amount of money from a major industrial concern. The threat turned out to be a hoax, and no money was paid.¹⁶⁹ The possibility of nuclear blackmail exists, nonetheless, either for political purposes or more individualistic ends, and the fact that a college student was recently able to draft plans for a crude but workable atom bomb, using library reference materials, has intensified concern.

The potential for harm of acts of political terrorism within the United States is increased by the vulnerability of modern, large-scale societies. The complexity and interdependence that make possible great population centers also create an Achilles' heel, and seemingly small breakdowns in the system can have devastating consequences. Thus, for example, a few years ago, a freighter smashed into the Tasman bridge which links Hobart, the capital of Tasmania, and its eastern suburbs. Although the collapse of the bridge resulted in only a few deaths and minor property damage, according to a study conducted by local police, it presented problems that the community could not resolve. "In the six months

after the disaster," notes *Time*, "crime rose 41% on the eastern shore, while downtown rates were falling. Car thefts shot up almost 50% in the isolated community, and neighborhood quarrels and complaints rose 300%."¹⁷⁰ The deliberate destruction caused by political sabotage—the disruption, let us say, of water supplies, electrical systems, or sewage disposal plants—could be devastating. The techniques used could be simple. According to a recent report (involving a case of individual gain, however, rather than political ideology), a tape recording left at City Hall in Philadelphia announced that 1,000 gallons of heating oil would be pumped into the water system if the city did not pay \$1 million as directed. The would-be extortionists were caught and convicted, but Philadelphia officials agreed that the scheme could have succeeded. Short of installing check valves at every building linked to the water supply, announced the assistant district attorney, every city is vulnerable to the threat of contamination by pumping in a noxious substance at a greater pressure than the pressure in the water main. "You could kill the population of any major city, I would think," he said, "by dumping poison into the water system that way. You could do it right through the faucet."¹⁷¹

The prediction of political crime is clearly beset with all the difficulties that attend other efforts to base future trends on past experience. It can be hypothesized, nonetheless, that the forces that gave rise to the violent confrontations of recent years are far from spent, as we suggested earlier. If new events that incite strong political passions do occur—military excursions, dislocations in the economy, threats of pollution, etc.—they may indeed generate violent protest in the atmosphere of cynicism and distrust bred by the Vietnam War, Watergate, and subsequent disclosures of government lawlessness. The assertion that terrorism in the form of politically motivated assassinations, kidnappings, and large-scale sabotage is likely to increase is another matter. The political and social conditions that appear to favor terrorism, such as strong, widespread support for extreme political movements, or the lack of avenues for the free expression of political ideas—are not present in the United States. Although the potential harm of terrorism is great and although the United States may in fact be used as a stage for a variety of terrorist actions, extreme measures to forestall a wave of future terrorism that does not materialize may prove to be more damaging than the terrorism itself.

Official Lawlessness

Our discussion of political crime has concentrated on illegal political dissent or what can be called crimes against government. No less significant are crimes committed by persons in government. The problem here is not one of sedition, violent demonstrations, acts of terrorism, and the like, but the illegal use of political power for political purposes by those in positions of legitimate authority.¹⁷² Individuals dismissed from their jobs for revealing government corruption, prosecutions undertaken for reasons of the individual's political opinions, the manufacture of evidence against one's opponent, illegal search and seizure, illegal arrest, illegal use of force by the police in the control of political protest, the unlawful repression of dissent by means of entrapment, illegal wiretapping—these are but a small sample of the misuses of power on the part of those in official positions acting illegally in the pursuit of ends that are political in character.¹⁷³

Until the 1960s, most of the writing in this area of criminology was concerned with the harassment of conscientious objectors during World War II and the actions of the police at the local levels.¹⁷⁴ In the 1960s and 1970s, the interest began to shift, influenced by a rush of events emblazoned in the headlines. Today, much of the interest of criminologists in political crime committed by government is centered on the illegal acts of the Presidency and the crimes of the FBI and CIA.

For some writers, an interest in the abuse of presidential power has remained fixed on the crimes of the Nixon Administration (the burglary of the office of Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist, the illegal entry of the Democratic Party's national headquarters, President Nixon's obstruction of justice, and the like) and on the causal role of the personalities of those involved. Other writers have taken a broader view. Jonathan Schell has argued that Watergate was not simply a product of Nixon's personality, but it also reflected the government's obsession with national security in an age of nuclear weapons.¹⁷⁵ And Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., an historian, sees the growth of presidential power developing over a long period of time and traces it to America's bid for world leadership. The crimes of Watergate are only a small part of a much larger problem and something of an aberration.¹⁷⁶

For Jack Douglas, illegal actions by the Executive Branch in the domestic sphere remain the central issue, and, as a sociologist, he is concerned with social structure as a source of the abuse of power, rather than the personalities of particular individuals. The fragmentation of American society and the erosion of government

authority have left a "vacuum of legitimacy," Douglas argues, where power becomes increasingly "extralegal and extramoral." In the years to come, he asserts, it is quite likely that events such as Watergate will become infrequent, not because of a rebirth of democratic controls and authority, but because the existing unstable system of power will be replaced by a new form of tyranny in which all government powers are illegitimate. "Some happy Democratic warriors, such as Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., predict that this gloomy . . . scenario will not unfold," says Douglas, "because Watergate and related events have made it possible to restrict the power of the Presidency by having Congress reseize such power. Nonsense. The vast increases in power of the Presidency have come about because of the almost universal demands of America's myriad Big Interest groups for more and more services (pay-offs to voters), which can be provided only by increasingly powerful, centralized bureaucratic government. Congress cannot meet those demands alone because it is the most fragmented, conflict-ridden, inept, and corrupt branch of the federal government. This drive toward centralized executive power will continue and with it will come a new form of democratic tyranny."¹⁷⁷ To Douglas, then, it appears very likely that the power of the executive will be grossly abused in the future, not because of idiosyncratic wrongdoing for personal gain, but because political power can be maintained only by catering to the demands of well-organized interest groups. The "new tyranny" will consist of a centralized executive power that trades favorable treatment for continuity in office.

In recent years, many people have come to believe that illegal activity on the part of the FBI and CIA must be viewed as an important element in a movement toward a "new form of domestic tyranny" of a somewhat different kind.¹⁷⁸ These agencies, it is argued, have frequently stepped beyond the limits of the law, and concerned themselves not simply with crime or threats to national security, but with persons legitimately calling for changes in the status quo. Thus, for example, Richard Rovere, a writer noted for his perceptive essays on legal issues, has pointed out that "investigations by Congress and the press in the past couple of years have revealed that members of the Federal Bureau of Investigation have committed many crimes in the line of duty over a long period. Without any legal authorization, they have tapped telephones, they have opened and read private mail, they have planted electronic bugs in offices and bedrooms, they have written anonymous and false letters to the spouses and associates and employees of people they wanted to harm, they have committed burglaries and other break-ins, they have paid informants

who later lied under oath, they have furnished funds and arms to paramilitary right-wing groups that have burned and bombed offices of left-wing groups and carried out assassination plots against left-wing leaders, they have used *agents provocateurs* to entrap others by planning and encouraging criminal conspiracies, they have incited police violence, they have blackmailed and slandered critics, and they have driven opposing radical militants to attack one another."¹⁷⁹ These actions, argues Rovere, have been undertaken as part of an illegitimate effort to control alleged "subversive" activities and are to be traced not simply to J. Edgar Hoover's preoccupation with radicalism, but also to an organizational obsession with maintaining the agency's reputation for invincibility in the pursuit of crime.

The illegal acts of the CIA have been interpreted in the same light.¹⁸⁰ Both the FBI and the CIA, it is said, are "out of control, runaway bureaucracies" that have managed to escape public surveillance and now threaten to subvert the American democratic social order. From this viewpoint, then, future trends in the abuse of power by these Federal bureaucracies will depend largely on the extent to which Congress is able to curb these organizations by means of more careful budgetary review, precise delimitations of organizational duties, and effective use of sanctions for the violation of the law. This view of the matter may be much in error, for illegal actions by agencies such as the FBI and the CIA may depend not on the inability of elected representatives to exercise control but on their willingness to do so.

As Halperin and others have indicated, little corrective action has been taken following disclosures of wrongdoing by the FBI and the CIA.¹⁸¹ Sanctions for past offenses are still possible, and Congress will undoubtedly pass legislation calling for stricter measures of control.¹⁸² But whether rules will be transformed into reality is another question.

The illegal actions of the FBI and the CIA thus appear to exist in a twilight world in which abuses of power are publicly deplored, and privately deplored as well, but have come to be tolerated nonetheless as a necessary evil. Illegal wiretaps on the Mafia, the infiltration of groups thought to be dangerous but which have not yet committed crimes, the use of clandestine operations outside the law in the interest of national security—all seem to be granted a kind of acceptance by an American public which does not approve such tactics, recognizes their illegality, and yet will not demand that they cease. To the extent that this ambivalence exists, public disclosure of criminal acts committed by the FBI and CIA is not likely to lead to effective measures that will bring these

“runaway” bureaucracies to heel, for they are doing the dirty work that many condemn and yet believe essential.¹⁸³ Since the ambivalence does appear to be widespread, and since urban unrest, increasing tension in international relations, and continuing radical militancy are likely to make the need for aggressive law enforcement seem still more essential to a large segment of American society, the problem of political crime in the form of illegal actions by the “crime-control establishment” may well grow worse in the decades to come.

Political Corruption

Abuse of political power in the form of corruption has long been an area of major interest for political scientists, but the topic has received relatively little attention from criminologists or those concerned with crime from a sociological perspective.¹⁸⁴ Political corruption is generally thought of as the illegal use of public office for personal monetary gain and thus does not, strictly speaking, fall within the category of political crime as we have been using the term, i.e., as referring to illegal acts committed for political purposes. Political corruption, nevertheless, constitutes an important form of the criminal misuse of political power, and it seems more appropriate to discuss it here rather than in those pages concerned with occupational criminal behavior.¹⁸⁵ This form of crime will undoubtedly occupy a much larger place in criminology in the future, not simply on the basis of incidence, but also—and perhaps more importantly—on the basis of an increasing sociological interest in the legitimacy of established authority.

Studies of corruption have generally not been able to rely on quantified data, for it is a type of crime that is more likely than most to go undetected and often fades into legal—if morally dubious—performance in public office.¹⁸⁶ Political corruption, in a sense, represents the persistence of an older tradition—the effort to use the power of the state for private ends, attuned to the demands of self, kin, and clique—brought into conflict with a modern ideal of the rational state serving the general public interest by means of a professional corps of public administrators.

“In England,” notes James Scott, “throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the lesser, wealthy gentry and the new commercial elite were able to buy positions of political authority either through the purchase of public office and peerage from the crown, or, especially later, through the purchase of parliamentary boroughs. In this way, the new classes began to replace the older nobility in the affairs of state. Objections were raised to all these

practices but they were not illegal until well into the nineteenth century."¹⁸⁷ Gradually, with the rise of democratic institutions and the modern bureaucratic state, the exercise of state power was placed—in theory—in the hands of civil servants, and the use of public office for individual monetary advantage passed into the sphere of the illegal.

Political corruption appears to have flourished in the United States in the early part of the nineteenth century, becoming particularly blatant in what one writer has termed "the commercial debauchery" of the period after the Civil War.¹⁸⁸ Looting the public till continued to be widespread with the growth of cities and the emergence of political machines attuned to the needs of immigrant groups that found the impersonal, "universalistic" bureaucracies of municipal government both unresponsive and alien. Then, gradually, the corruption of city government began to decline. "The most important fact about American municipal government over the last twenty years has been the dramatic improvement in the standards and honesty of public service," says James Wilson. "In no large city today is it likely that a known thief could be elected mayor (how many unknown thieves are elected must be a matter of speculation); a few decades ago, it would have been surprising if the mayor were *not* a boodler."¹⁸⁹

The problem of corruption, Wilson notes, has been approached from three major theoretical viewpoints. First, corruption can be explained on the basis of a particular political ethos or style that attaches a relatively low value to strict adherence to formal rules and standards of efficiency and a relatively high value to favors, personal loyalty, and personal gain. The existence of this ethos in immigrant groups (which needed help, it has been said, more than justice) set the stage for widespread political corruption in which votes were traded for aid, and the misuse of office was ignored. Second, corruption can be traced to the extraordinary temptations that are provided by government office, and it is opportunity rather than personal characteristics or the political ethos of the citizenry that explains the abuse of political power. Third, corruption can be attributed to the structural defects of American government. The system of checks and balances, with its formal separation of power, can leave government paralyzed if the executive, legislative, and judicial branches negate one another's will. What the founders have put asunder, says Wilson, citing the work of Henry James Ford writing in 1904, the politicians must join together. Corruption in the form of a favor for a favor is the mechanism by which necessary informal cooperation in American government is achieved.¹⁹⁰

Political scientists are generally agreed, Wilson argues, that the decline of municipal corruption in recent decades is due to a reduction in demand for and tolerance of corruption, as more and more voters have become part of the middle class; the increased scrutiny of local affairs by civic associations and the mass media; and the rise of professional forms of government, such as the council-manager plan. All have helped to reduce partisan influence.¹⁹¹ These forces, however, have not been at work at the level of State politics to anywhere near the same extent, and as a result political corruption continues to flourish there while municipal governments show much improvement. "The ethnic style of politics," says Wilson, "is weakening in the cities but not in the states; more boodle is lying around with no one watching in state capitals than in city halls; and state governments continue to be badly decentralized, with formal authority divided among a host of semi-autonomous boards, commissions, and departments."¹⁹² Today, it is at the State House rather than City Hall where the big money is to be found, he argues, for it is the States that "build roads and in so doing spend billions on contractors, landowners, engineers, and 'consultants.' They regulate truckers, public utilities, insurance companies, banks, small loan firms, and pawnbrokers; they issue paroles and pardons, license drivers, doctors, dentists, liquor stores, barbers, beauticians, teachers, chiropractors, real estate brokers, and scores of other occupations and professions; they control access to natural resources, and supervise industrial safety and workmen's compensation programs. The stakes are enormous."¹⁹³

Political corruption at the local level, particularly in some of the large cities and in the growing suburbs, may be more of a problem than Wilson's analysis suggests. The stakes continue to be high in such matters as zoning or gambling or building codes. In general, however, Wilson appears to be right. Political corruption is probably greater at the State level, and there seems little reason to believe that this pattern will not continue. The crime of bribery and other forms of official misfeasance at the State level are likely to form a part of future crime which deserves far more attention from criminology—and the administrators of the criminal law—than it has received in the past.

In addition, there is the question of whether the misuse of public office for personal gain will emerge more prominently at the Federal level in the coming decades, if the United States moves further in the direction of what one writer has called a kleptocracy: a society of the corrupt, for the corrupt, by the corrupt.¹⁹⁴ According to a number of writers, misconduct in office for private gain

is relatively rare in the Federal Government, and the Golden Age of Boondoggle—roughly from the end of Reconstruction to the beginning of the Great Depression—lies well in the past. “Though some may find it surprising,” Bayless Manning wrote in 1964, “the fact is that in this country we are currently living in an era of unexampled honesty in public administration. Evolution of modern administrative techniques for fiscal control, development of a professional sense in the civil service, virtual elimination of the spoils system, spread of competitive bidding, increase in public education, and other basic shifts in the national political organism have reduced blatant peculation of federal funds almost to the vanishing point. By now the governmental record is much better than that of private business in coping with the problem of the dishonest employee.”¹⁹⁵

Many observers might consider this viewpoint somewhat naive—particularly now, when a widespread suspicion of politicians throws a shadow on any claim of political virtue. “Blatant peculation of federal funds” does appear to be infrequent, and convictions for bribery are certainly the exception rather than the rule. Nonetheless, there remain enormous opportunities for illegal enrichment at the Federal level, in the area of military and General Service Administration procurement, for example, and the extent to which these opportunities are seized calls for much more research by scholars concerned with criminal behavior. The major problem with corruption at the Federal level may lie not in obvious official misconduct, such as kickbacks or the explicit selling of votes on specific issues, but in more subtle forms of misconduct, such as may be involved in accepting campaign contributions.

One thing is clear—the laws about the public disclosure of contributions in national political campaigns have been flouted for many, many years in terms of both the spirit and the literal content of the legal rules. For many decades, says Jethro Lieberman, “no Attorney General has ever prosecuted any person, successful or unsuccessful, rich or poor, for violating the campaign disclosure laws. Before 1969, corporations were prosecuted on only two occasions for violating provisions of the federal campaign laws. Since that time a handful of violators have been prosecuted.”¹⁹⁶ It seems unlikely that this form of illegal behavior will be reduced in coming years, despite much talk of reform, and the increasing costs of political campaigns may help to make the problem grow worse. “In spite of all the past campaign financing laws,” says George Thayer, “including the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, which has sought to eliminate campaign financing abuses,

a significant part of most campaigns for the top federal and state offices has been and continues to be paid for with unreported cash."¹⁹⁷

The extent to which campaign contributions are linked to misconduct in office remains largely unknown. George Thayer has argued that a specific quid pro quo is usually *not* involved, although there may be an expectation of access or a sympathetic hearing on issues in the future. It would appear, nonetheless, that this is an important area of behavior that may include both "input" and "output" corruption. The former, says James Scott, refers to the illegal use of office at the legislative stage, while the latter refers to the illegal use of office in the enforcement of laws and rules after they have been promulgated.¹⁹⁸ The increasing role of the Federal Government in private business, the growing importance of tax policies for business profit and loss, the enlarging scope of international business operations in which government policies and regulations are even more significant—all may mean that attempts to influence the legislative *and* the administrative process by subtle forms of payoffs will become more frequent or more extensive at the Federal level than has been the case in the past. It remains to be seen if criminology—increasingly intent on providing a more balanced view of "the crime problem" in the United States, rather than concentrating on those offenses included in the Crime Index of the FBI—will devote more study to the forms of illegal behavior lying outside its traditional scope of inquiry.

CHAPTER 4

Conclusions

In the preceding pages, we have tried to catch a glimpse of crime in years to come by examining how the underlying causal factors, as perceived by current theory in criminology, are likely to change. It must be said again that all such predictions are statements of what may be, rather than conclusively settled outcomes. They deal with possible future conditions that need to be taken into account, not the inevitable sweep of natural phenomena beyond mankind's control. They are general rather than specific, much influenced by intuition that fills the gaps where theory grounded in empirical research has not yet reached, and peers ahead but a short distance. Their usefulness lies in their cautionary nature.

Much of our discussion has been limited to a consideration of existing trends, of situations now present if only in embryo. It is quite possible that the future of crime in the United States will be influenced by events that we have touched on lightly or ignored. A nuclear disaster, for example, could set loose a wave of looting and rioting that could persist for a long time or grow into public disorder. A new disease—a spontaneous mutation, perhaps, or one created in a laboratory—could be controlled only by a serum that remained in expensive and short supply, and result in many desperate acts of theft. Some forms of crime, as suggested elsewhere, could be turned into forms of sport, filled with danger and excitement, in a world grown increasingly routine.¹⁹⁹ The discovery of powerful drugs that can be manufactured at home, cheaply, and with a minimum of technical knowledge and equipment (something akin to so-called Angel Dust or PCP) could create new problems. And beyond these lies the possibility of thermonuclear war or a collapse of public order brought on by a cataclysmic shock to the economy, as the resource base of industrial societies suddenly requires a fourfold or fivefold increase in investment for the extraction of common minerals or is restricted by international developments. If we have not discussed these at any length, it is not because they are impossible; rather, it is because, from the viewpoint of the social sciences, they remain “chance” events,

outside the reach of theoretical prediction. Like Banquo's ghost, they will not go away, and they may yet make all our forecasts irrelevant.

As we have indicated, there are some encouraging signs that point to a possible reduction of criminal behavior in American society. An increasing proportion of younger people involved in schooling beyond the high school level—which appears likely—could work in the direction of reducing the relatively high crime rates of those in the younger age groups. Furthermore, changes in the age structure will probably contribute to a drop in the crime rate for offenses such as larceny, burglary, and auto theft, as these are crimes that tend to be committed disproportionately by the young. (The impact on crimes of violence is likely to be less, for there is less of a correlation between age and violent crime.) Since larceny, burglary, and auto theft make up a large part of the offenses contained in the Crime Index of the FBI's *Uniform Crime Reports*, there should be a future decrease in this measure which many people view as an overall indicator of criminal behavior.

The changing age structure of the U.S. population has been a major factor in producing an optimistic view of the future of crime that seems gradually to be emerging in the public mind²⁰⁰ and has been an important factor in producing the drop in the crime rate reported by the FBI in the past few years. It would be a mistake, however, to conclude that the crime problem in the United States has therefore crested and that the country is definitely now entering a long period of diminishing criminal behavior.

In the first place, the fact that young adolescents, who are most inclined to crime, will form a decreasing proportion of the total population in the next several decades may be offset by an increasing tendency for young adolescents to engage in criminal behavior. The worsening plight of those in the central cities and the prospect of increasing economic difficulties for the society as a whole in the years ahead make this possibility a strong likelihood, despite the ameliorative effect that can be expected due to increasing involvement in education beyond the high school level.

In the second place, the decline in the proportion of adolescents in American society is likely to end in the 1990s, and thereafter the proportion will probably remain approximately the same until the year 2050, if the assumptions about fertility made by the Bureau of the Census turn out to be correct.²⁰¹ Estimates of what will happen some 70 years from now are obviously even more risky than attempts to forecast the next few decades, but the important point is that a short-term change in the age structure

should not be viewed as anything like an end to the problem of crime, even if the short-term effects are those expected. In some 10 or 15 years, any drop in the crime rate that stems from a decline in the proportion of adolescents will probably have run its course.²⁰² Furthermore, since crime rates have reached very high levels compared to some 20 years ago, a substantial crime problem will remain in spite of the benefits that may flow from a change in the age structure.

In the third place, optimism about a future drop in the amount of criminal behavior in American society—based on a change in the age structure—ignores the wide range of crime. The crimes of adolescents are actually only a small proportion of all crimes committed, even though some typically youthful offenses such as auto theft, burglary, and larceny may come to the attention of the police more often than many other offenses and loom large in the Crime Index. Such crimes may become relatively less frequent, with a consequent decline of the Crime Index, but there remain many types of criminal behavior, such as fraud and employee theft, that may become more common—a point we return to in a moment. Changes in the age structure touch only a portion of the problem of crime.

A decreased emphasis in U.S. society on monetary success for its own sake could reduce the systemic disjunction between ends and means that has figured so large in the theory of anomie. There are indications that point in this direction, although, as we have suggested, a reduction of the stress on economic achievement may be a product of an era of affluence, when there seems to be more than enough to go around. Hard times in coming decades may sharpen the push to get ahead or simply to stay even.

Changes in the structure of the American family, such as an increase in the incidence of divorce, might appear threatening, if the conventional view of a close link between delinquency and the broken family were valid. We have argued that such a link has *not* been established and that, whatever may be the consequences of the shifts that are unquestionably taking place in patterns of domestic relations, a growth in criminal behavior cannot be counted as one of them with any certainty.

Against any encouraging portents of the future of crime, we must set some relatively ominous signs. The failure to solve the problems of the metropolis, we have suggested, points to continuing or increasing frustration and consequent deviance in the form of crime. The flow of migration, both legal and illegal, almost certainly promises an increase in criminal behavior if migrants are forced into ghettos with limited opportunities for social mobility.

Chronic unemployment, for those at all levels of the stratification system but particularly for those at the bottom of the social heap, may emerge as a stubborn problem for advanced industrial societies such as the United States, along with withdrawal from the labor market on the part of those who have become too discouraged to seek work. The result is likely to be a growth in criminal behavior, particularly if unemployment increasingly comes to mean membership in a class of permanent poor. The effect may be indirect and may, indeed, show up more strongly in the area of crimes of violence rather than in crimes against property. The sociological evidence strongly suggests that young males, unemployed or at the bottom of the socioeconomic ladder, provide the soil in which a culture of violence is likely to flourish. It can be presumed that, if economic growth in the United States slows, these problems will grow still worse, as those at the bottom of society's class system face intensifying competition for available social rewards.

Criminology has yet to explore political crime and white-collar crime in great detail. As a consequence, the future of such crimes remains even more uncertain than the future of those crimes against property and against the person that have traditionally absorbed the attention of the discipline. There is some reason to believe that violent political protest can emerge on the American scene, under certain conditions, and that terrorist groups from outside the United States are apt to pose a serious issue. Furthermore, the increasing importance of government in economic affairs makes political corruption appear more tempting than ever, with subtle or not-so-subtle bribery used to influence both legislation and administration. The result is likely to be more violations of the law, even though a "post-Watergate morality" is now possibly at work, increasing public sensitivity to the abuse of political office.

As far as white-collar crime is concerned, the social norms concerning the sanctity of private property appear to be eroding in the United States, as ownership becomes ever more abstract, diluted, and impersonal in a bureaucratized mass society. To the extent that this is true, American society is likely to experience an increasing frequency of "unconventional" crime, such as thefts committed by members of the middle class, corporate wheeling and dealing beyond the law, fraudulent claims, and the like.

Crime against property can be thought of as falling into two great categories. On the one hand, there are those offenses that are rooted in poverty or prolonged deprivation and that are seen as being in clear violation of the law. These crimes often appear irrational to society-at-large, in the sense that the penalties are

high if the offender is caught and the possible gains are small. But the criminal behavior is often part of a deviant or subcultural lifestyle, in which the illegality of the act is not only admitted but also often admired as an affront to established society. A great many of the crimes that occupy the attention of the police, such as larcenies, robberies, burglaries, and auto thefts, appear to belong in this category—although there are numerous exceptions—and are strongly rooted in the frustrated expectations of those at the bottom of the social heap, the lack of conventional group ties, and participation in subcultures that stand opposed to the dominant society.

On the other hand, there are those property offenses that appear to be much less impulsive and much more carefully weighed with an eye to possible benefits. The individuals who commit these crimes do not identify themselves with a deviant group, and their aim is not to defy society but rather to make sure that the appearance of respectability and conformity is maintained, despite the illegal behavior. These crimes, indeed, are often of an ambiguous nature, with illegality subject to complex interpretation of the factual circumstances, the legal rules, and the actors' intent. These offenses cannot be traced to acute economic need and its attendant problems, for they are often committed by members of the middle class who give every appearance of being adequately socialized and tied to conforming society by a multitude of conventional relationships. The source of these crimes lies in the ability to bend social norms to fit the individual's goals, and this ability is not an idiosyncratic or an individual affair, but a product of cultural definitions that allow the individual to violate the rules without directly opposing them.²⁰³

Changes in the frequency of crimes in the first category appear to depend heavily on changes in levels of perceived economic deprivation, the amount of social disorganization, and the number, size, and influence of deviant subcultures. If the growth of the economy surpasses population growth, if the aspirations of those at the bottom of the economic ladder are not badly thwarted, the rate of growth of crimes in the first category could level off, although, the evidence we have examined does not provide much grounds for optimism on this score. The forces that produce crimes in the second category appear to be largely unchecked. Continuing changes in the nature of property that create ever greater ambiguity about the nature of ownership, a growing impersonality in society, the unceasing stimulation of enlarging opportunities for financial finagling—all make it likely that the incidence of crimes such as fraud, for example, or embezzlement, or middle-class shoplifting

will grow greater. The increase is not likely to be dramatic or abrupt but will reflect persistent, long-range patterns of change in American society.

If shifts in modes of criminal behavior do occur, the methods of society for dealing with crime are likely to change as well. At the present time, the ideal of rehabilitation, long dominant in penology, has fallen out of favor. It is widely argued that little or nothing is known about how to change criminals into non-criminals. American society is being urged to crack down on crime, to enlarge the activities of the police, and to impose harsher penalties. Prisons, it is said, probably do not reform or deter, but at least offenders are prevented from committing crimes while they are confined.²⁰⁴

This pessimistic view of how society must deal with crime appears to be a product of a variety of factors, including a disenchantment with the tenets of liberal thought, a growing skepticism about the claims of psychotherapy, and more careful efforts to evaluate outcomes of methods of correction. Of prime importance is the fact that, from the beginning of the 1960s to the middle of the 1970s, the crime rate in the United States increased sharply, despite all the talk of corrections, rehabilitation, and the like. A change in approach seemed to be needed, and to an increasing extent a "get-tough" policy came to be accepted as the appropriate strategy.²⁰⁵

If crimes such as murder, assault, rape, robbery, and larceny become more numerous in the next several decades, a "get-tough" approach to the control of crime is likely to appear still more attractive. The concept of locking up people not to rehabilitate them but simply to prevent them from committing new crimes can be expected to flourish. Funds can be expected to flow to prosecutors to increase their efficiency, prison sentences to lengthen, and police powers to be seen as in need of expansion. If offenses of the middle class also increase, perhaps forming a larger part of the total crime problem or gaining a larger share of public concern, reactions to crime could move in new directions. A renewed allegiance to traditional ideas of rehabilitation does not seem a probable course, since vocational training, programs of remedial education, counseling, and group therapy (of dubious worth in modifying the criminality of lower class offenders) are not apt to be seen as peculiarly effective for middle-class property offenders. Nor does incapacitation by means of imprisonment appear probable, since society is not inclined to define middle-class offenders as hardened, dangerous recidivists who must be locked up. Instead, efforts at the control of such offenders are

apt to take two forms. First, there is likely to be a growing emphasis on types of deterrent sanctions thought to be especially suited for members of the middle class, such as heavy fines and much publicity attached to criminal convictions.²⁰⁶ And second, it can be expected that much effort will be directed to prevention, by means of sophisticated accounting systems, electronic surveillance, computer programs constructed with an eye to security, etc. The effort to control crime, that is to say, may increasingly shift from an attempt to reform the internal moral character of the law violator to an attempt to modify the external social environment, presumably with a greater hope of success.²⁰⁷

Such changes might be seen as an advance, but it must also be pointed out that they create the danger of a bipartite correctional system. Lower class offenders, convicted of "conventional" crimes, would be subjected increasingly to fixed terms in prison, whereas middle-class offenders who have been convicted of various forms of white-collar crime would be fined or morally censured. It might be claimed, of course, that this is what the United States tends to do now.²⁰⁸ But if future patterns of crime and corrections lead to less, rather than more, equality before the law, the legitimacy of the administration of justice in the United States will be seriously compromised in the eyes of many.

In discussing the future of crime, then, we must be concerned not only with changes in the crime rate but also with the meanings and interpretations attached to crime by society. Will crime be seen as a mass of individual harms or as a threat to society itself in the form of a challenge to the normative system? Will crime be thought to be due to a flaw in the individual or caused by a "pathological" social environment? Will crime be viewed largely as a lower class phenomenon or as something that is to be found at every level of society? The relative strength of perceptions such as these will do much to influence how the nature of the crime problem will be defined in the United States in coming decades and what steps are taken to solve it, and these in turn are likely to have at least some influence on the incidence of criminal behavior.

This is what we meant, at least in part, when we said earlier that the future is invented and that no talk of scenarios and Delphic methods and extrapolations can hide the indeterminacy of things to come. Yet, some possibilities appear more probable than others, and if this monograph helps in sorting out these possibilities, it will have served its purpose.

Footnotes

1. Wilbert E. Moore, "Forthcoming Patterns of Social and Political Structure," in Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. (ed.), *Law in a Changing Society* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: 1968), p. 12.
2. See, for example, Robert A. Nisbet, "The Year 2000 and All That," *Commentary*, Vol. 45, June 1968, pp. 60-66; and Dennis H. Wrong, "On Thinking About the Future," *The American Sociologist*, Vol. 9, February 1974, pp. 26-31. For an extended critique of historical determinism, see Karl R. Popper, *The Open Society and Its Enemies* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1950). For a Soviet view of historical determinism, see Murad Saifulin (ed.), *The Future of Society: A Critique of Modern Bourgeois Philosophical and Socio-Political Conceptions* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1973).
3. See Daniel Bell, *The Coming of Post-Industrial Society: A Venture in Social Forecasting* (New York: Basic Books, 1976), pp. 167-212.
4. See Wilbert E. Moore, "Predicting Discontinuities in Social Change," *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 29, June 1964, pp. 331-338.
5. See Alfred Oxenfeldt, *Futurism*. (Mimeographed paper prepared for the Office of Naval Research, Group Psychology Programs, Contract #N00014-67-A-0108-0034 NR 177-943, 1973.)
6. Edward Ross, *The Social Trend* (New York: The Century Company, 1922), pp. 1-2.
7. The National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence, Staff Report, Vol. 11, *Crimes of Violence* (Washington, D.C.: Supt. of Docs., U.S. Govt., Print. Off. 1969).
8. See Jackson Toby, "A Prospect of Less Crime in the 1980s," *The New York Times*, October 26, 1977.
9. See Morton Kramer, "Psychiatric Services and the Changing Institutional Scene," paper presented at the President's Biomedical Research Panel, National Institutes of Health, Bethesda, Md., November 25, 1975 (mimeographed).
10. See Arthur Rosett and Donald R. Cressey, *Justice by Consent* (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott, 1976).
11. See, for example, Malcolm M. Feeley, "The Effects of Heavy Caseloads," paper delivered at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, 1975. See also James Eisenstein and Herbert Jacob, *Felony Justice: An Organizational Analysis of Criminal Courts* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1977).

12. See Abraham S. Blumberg, *Criminal Justice* (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1967).
13. See, for example, Robert Martinson, "What Works? - Questions and Answers About Prison Reform," in Seymour I. Halleck et al., (eds.), *The Aldine Crime and Justice Annual 1974* (Chicago: Aldine, 1975).
14. Gilbert Geis, *Not the Law's Business* (Washington, D.C.: Supt. of Docs., U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1972).
15. See Norval Morris and Gordon Hawkins, *The Honest Politician's Guide to Crime Control* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1970), p. 5.
16. See U.S. Department of Justice, *Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics 1976* (Washington, D.C.: Supt. of Docs., U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1977), p. 322.
17. See Jethro K. Leberman, *How the Government Breaks the Law* (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1973). See also Theodore L. Becker and Vernon C. Murray, eds., *Government Lawlessness in America* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971).
18. See Jerome H. Skolnick, *The Politics of Protest* (New York: Ballantine Books, 1969).
19. See Isidora Silver (ed.), *The Crime-Control Establishment* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1974). It is worth noting that the proportion of the public giving the FBI a "highly favorable" rating fell from 84% to 37% between 1965 and 1975. See U.S. Department of Justice, *op. cit.*, p. 321. The drop was greatest among those under 30 and those with a college background.
20. See Leslie Wilkins, "Crime and Criminal Justice at the Turn of the Century," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 408 (July 1973), pp. 13-29.
21. See, for example, Herman Kahn, et al., *The Next 2000 Years: A Scenario for America and the World* (New York: William Morrow, 1976).
22. See Robert L. Heilbroner, *An Inquiry into the Human Prospect* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1975).
23. Science fiction has probably provided the most imaginative glimpses of possible futures in what one writer has called "novels of forensic disposition." See Kingsley Amis, *New Maps of Hell* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1960). Any list of such works would probably include Aldous Huxley's *Brave New World*, Edward Bellamy's *Looking Backward*, George Orwell's *1984*, and B.F. Skinner's *Walden II*.
24. For an excellent review of criminological theory, see George B. Vold, *Theoretical Criminology* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1958); and Hermann Mannheim (ed.), *Pioneers in Criminology* (Montclair, N.J.: Patterson Smith, 1972). For a more recent analysis of criminological theory, with an ideological flavor, see Ian Taylor, Paul Walton, and Jock Young, *The New Criminology* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1973).
25. See Marshall B. Clinard (ed.), *Anomie and Deviant Behavior* (New York: The Free Press, 1964).
26. See Gwynn Nettler, *Explaining Crime* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1974), Chapter 8.

27. See Edwin H. Sutherland and Donald R. Cressey, *Criminology* (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott, 1978), Chapter 4.
28. See Edwin M. Schur, *Labeling Deviant Behavior: Its Sociological Implications* (New York: Harper and Row, 1971). See also Edwin M. Lemert, *Human Deviance, Social Problems, and Social Control* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1976).
29. See, for example, William Ryan, *Blaming the Victim* (New York: Vinage Books, 1971).
30. See Melvin M. Tumin, *Patterns of Society* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1973).
31. See Judith A. Wilks, "Ecological Correlates of Crime and Delinquency," in the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice, *Task Force Report: Crime and Its Impact — An Assessment* (Washington, D.C.: Supt. of Docs., U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1967), pp. 138-156.
32. In the case of homicide, for example, the rate in rural areas outstrips the rate in cities of 100,000 population or less, but not the rate in larger cities. See Federal Bureau of Investigation, *Uniform Crime Reports* (Washington, D.C.: Supt. Of Docs., U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1977), pp. 153-154. Recent work by Kenneth Polk and his colleagues has found that delinquency rates in nonmetropolitan counties in Oregon are similar to those observed in a study of metropolitan Philadelphia, suggesting that delinquency is not to be viewed as primarily a large-city phenomenon. See *Teenage Delinquency in Small Town America, Research Report - 5* (Washington, D.C.: DHEW Publication No. (ADM) 75-138. 1974). The juveniles in the Philadelphia study, however, were some 3 to 4 years younger than the cohort of high school sophomores examined by Polk (which could have made a substantial difference), and the extent to which a distinction between metropolitan and nonmetropolitan counties corresponds to the distinction between urban and rural areas is open to question. See also U.S. Department of Justice, *Criminal Victimization in the United States: A Comparison of 1975 and 1976 Findings* (Washington, D.C.: Supt. of Docs., U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1977).
33. Judith A. Wilks, *op. cit.*, p. 149.
34. See Terrence Morris, *The Criminal Area* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1957).
35. See Edwin H. Sutherland and Donald R. Cressey, *op. cit.*, Chapter 4.
36. See Charles E. Reasons and Jack L. Kukendall (eds.), *Race, Crime, and Justice* (Pacific Palisades, Calif.: Goodyear Publishing, 1972).
37. See Marvin Wolfgang, *Patterns in Criminal Homicide* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1958), pp. 188-189.
38. The extent to which subcultural norms support violence indirectly or by implication rather than by an explicit imperative has yet to be explored in detail, yet it seems likely that much of the normative approval of violence is based on the former rather than the latter. The cultural or subcultural support of criminal behavior, then, may often be a subtle matter and difficult to detect, but its causal role in crime may be vital nonetheless.
39. See Raymond D. Gastil, "Homicide and a Regional Culture of Violence," *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 36, June 1971, pp. 412-427; and Sheldon

Hackney, "Southern Violence," in Hugh Davis Graham and Ted Robert Gurr (eds.) *The History of Violence in America* (New York: Bantam Books, 1969), p. 505. In a contrary argument, Loftin and Hill claim that high rates of violent crime in the South may be related to the incidence of extreme poverty rather than a distinctive southern attitude. The deprivation shared by the poor in both the rural South and the urban North may produce a common tendency toward homicides and assaults. See Collin Loftin and Robert H. Hill, "Regional Subculture and Homicide: An Examination of the Gastil-Hackney Thesis," *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 39, October 1974, pp. 714-724.

40. See William Gorham and Nathan Glazer (eds.), *The Urban Predicament* (Washington, D.C.: The Urban Institute, 1976), p. 9.

41. *Ibid.*, p. 14.

42. The South is expected to have the largest total metropolitan population in the year 2000, while the West is expected to pull nearly abreast of the Northeast. See Jerome P. Pickard, "U.S. Population Growth and Expansion, 1970-2000, with Population Projections," in Sara Mills Mazie (ed.), *The U.S. Commission on Population Growth and the American Future, Population, Distribution, and Policy* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1972), pp. 127-182.

43. See William M. Bulkeley, "Urban Comeback," *The Wall Street Journal*, 6 June 1977.

44. William Gorham and Nathan Glazer, *op. cit.*, p. 32.

45. See Neil N. Gold, "The Mismatch of Jobs and Low-Income People in Metropolitan Areas and Its Implications for the Central-City Poor," in U.S. Commission on Population Growth and the American Future, *op. cit.*, p. 445.

46. See Report to the Congress by the Comptroller General of the United States, *Immigration — The Need to Reassess* (Washington, D.C.: Supt. of Docs., U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1976).

47. See "Immigration," *Time*, May 2, 1977.

48. See Wayne A. Cornelius, "When the Door is Closed to Illegal Aliens, Who Pays?," *The New York Times*, June 1, 1977.

49. A prejudice against illegal immigrants who are seen as competing for jobs in a period of high unemployment may prove to be a powerful incentive for the creation of a national system of identification cards, which has long been regarded as a serious threat to civil liberties. For a far more apocalyptic view — involving civil war and the outbreak of international strife between Mexico and the United States — see Richard Downes, "The Future Consequences of Illegal Immigration," *The Futurist*, Vol. XI, April 1977, pp. 125-127.

50. The National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence, *Violent Crime: The Challenge to Our Cities* (New York: George Braziller, 1969), pp. 69-70. Quoted in Ely Chinoy (ed.), *The Urban Future* (New York: Lieber-Atherton, 1973), pp. 170-171.

51. See The Federal Bureau of Investigation, *op. cit.*, p. 154.

52. The establishment of a so-called "combat zone" (a section of the city where strip bars, X-rated movie houses, and adult bookstores are confined under zoning laws) has been attempted in Boston, creating a good deal of

controversy. See David Gumpert, "Problems in the Combat Zone," *The Wall Street Journal*, June 30, 1977.

53. Herbert J. Gans, "Why Exurbanites Won't Reurbanize Themselves," *The New York Times*, February 12, 1977.

54. See Frederick C. Klein, "Rebuilding Blocks," *The Wall Street Journal*, June 20, 1977.

55. See Robert Reinhold, "Experts' Outlook for Older Cities: Gloomy Future, Difficult Changes," *The New York Times*, June 9, 1977.

56. See John M. Martin and Joseph P. Fitzpatrick, *Delinquency Behavior: A Redefinition of the Problem* (New York: Random House, 1965), Chapter 4.

57. See Thomas P. Monahan, "Family Status and the Delinquent Child: A Reappraisal and Some New Findings," *Social Forces*, Vol. 35, March 1957, pp. 251-258.

58. Nancy Barton Wise, "Juvenile Delinquency Among Middle-Class Girls," in Rose Giallombardo (ed.), *Juvenile Delinquency* (New York: John Wiley, 1976), pp. 51-58.

59. See Clifford R. Shaw and Henry D. McKay, "Social Factors in Juvenile Delinquency," National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement in *Report on the Causes of Crime* (Washington, D.C.: Supt. of Docs., U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1931).

60. See Karen Wilkinson, "The Broken Family and Juvenile Delinquency: Scientific Explanation or Ideology?" *Social Problems*, Vol. 21, June 1974, pp. 726-739.

61. See Hermann Mannheim, *Comparative Criminology* (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1965), p. 618.

62. Karen Wilkinson, *op. cit.* See also C. Wright Mills, "The Professional Ideology of Social Pathologists," *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 49, 1943, pp. 165-180.

63. See Bert N. Adams, *The Family: A Sociological Interpretation* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1975), pp. 266-273.

64. Karen Wilkinson, *op. cit.*, pp. 735-736.

65. See William J. Goode, *World Revolution and Family Patterns* (New York: The Free Press, 1963), pp. 6-7. See also Suzanne Keller, "Does the Family Have a Future?" in Arlene S. Skolnick and Jerome H. Skolnick (eds.), *Family in Transition* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1977), pp. 578-592. It is worth noting that at the present time only 67 percent of children under 18 live with two parents, both married once. See "The Family in Transition," *The New York Times*, November 27, 1977.

66. See Paul C. Glick, *Some Recent Changes in American Families* (Current Population Reports: Special Studies, Series P-23, No. 52, Washington, D.C.: Supt. of Docs., U.S. Govt. Print. Off., no date given).

67. See Rita James Simon, *The Contemporary Woman and Crime* (National Institute of Mental Health, Center for Studies of Crime and Delinquency;

DHEW Pub. No. (ADM) 75-161. Washington, D.C.: Supt. of Docs., U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1975), pp. 21-23.

68. Paul C. Glick, *op. cit.*, p. 3.

69. *Ibid.*

70. *Ibid.*, p. 4. See also Robert Reinhold, "Trend to Living Alone Brings Economic and Social Change," *The New York Times*, March 20, 1977, and James Ramey, "Multi-Adult Household: Living Group of the Future?," *The Futurist*, Vol. X, April 1976, pp. 78-83.

71. See Paul C. Glick and Arthur J. Norton, "Perspectives on the Recent Upturn in Divorce and Remarriage," *Demography*, Vol. 10, August 1973, pp. 301-314.

72. See William J. Goode, "Family Disorganization," in Robert E. Merton and Robert Nisbet (eds.), *Contemporary Social Problems* (New York: Harcourt Brace Javanovich, 1971), pp. 515-554.

73. See Lawrence Rosen, "The Broken Home and Male Delinquency," in Marvin Wolfgang, Leonard Savitz, and Norman Johnson (eds.) *The Sociology of Crime and Delinquency* (New York: John Wiley, 1970), pp. 489-495.

74. See Alan Pifer, "Women Working: Toward a New Society," reprinted from *The 1976 Annual Report*, Carnegie Corporation of New York.

75. See Gwynn Nettler, *op. cit.*, Chapter 9.

76. See Freda Adler, *Sisters in Crime: The Rise of the New Female Criminal* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1975), p. 85.

77. *Ibid.*, p. 1.

78. See Rita Simon, *op. cit.*, p. 37. Serious crimes, in Simon's study are equivalent to Type I offenses of the *Uniform Crime Index* of the FBI (but excluding rape), and include murder, aggravated assault, robbery, burglary, larceny, and auto theft.

79. *Ibid.*, p. 39. In June, 1977, however, the Federal Bureau of Prisons announced the establishment of a maximum security prison for women. The creation of the new unit was stimulated, it was said, by the concern of Federal prison authorities over the rising incidence of violent crimes, such as kidnaping and bank robberies, by women. See James F. Clarity, "U.S. Creating Maximum Security Prison for Women," *The New York Times*, June 29, 1977.

80. Simon, *op. cit.*, p. 17. See also Dale Hoffman-Bustamante, "The Nature of Female Criminality," *Issues in Criminology*, Vol. 8, Fall 1973, pp. 117-135.

81. In recent years, the women's liberation movement has exerted a wider appeal, in terms of race and class, and its impact on social behavior (including crime) is likely to grow. See William H. Chafe, "Feminism in the 1970s," *Dis-sent*, Fall 1974.

82. See Stephen Schafer, *Theories in Criminology* (New York: Random House, 1969), p. 256. See also George B. Vold, *Theoretical Criminology* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1958), Ch. 9.

83. It has been suggested that not having a job and not looking for a job (that is, not being in the labor force, according to the definition of the Federal Government) may be more important as a causal factor than not having a job and continuing to look for one, which is categorized as unemployment. See Llad Phillips and Harold L. Votey, Jr., "Crime, Youth, and the Labor Market," *Journal of Political Economy*, Vol. 80, May/June, 1972, pp. 491-504. Unemployment statistics, it is argued, may be a poor indicator of economic need, a sense of alienation and resentment, etc., compared to labor force participation rates.
84. See U.S. Department of Justice, *Survey of Inmates of State Correctional Facilities*, No. SD-NPS-SR-2 (Washington, D.C.: Supt. of Docs., Govt. Print. Off. March 1976), p. 2.
85. See Leon Radzinowicz, "Economic Pressures," in Leon Radzinowicz and Marvin E. Wolfgang (eds.), *The Criminal in Society* (New York: Basic Books, 1971), pp. 420-442; see also Hermann Mannheim, *Comparative Criminology* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1965), Ch. 23.
86. See Thorsten Sellin, *Research Memorandum on Crime in the Depression* (New York: Social Science Research Council, 1937).
87. Edwin H. Sutherland and Donald R. Cressey, *Criminology op. cit.* pp. 225-226.
88. See Joint Economic Committee, Congress of the United States, *Estimating the Social Costs of National Economic Policy: Implications for Mental and Physical Health, and Criminal Aggression* (Washington, D.C.: Supt. of Docs., U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1976).
89. See Albert K. Cohen and James F. Short, Jr., "Crime and Juvenile Delinquency," in Robert K. Merton and Robert Nisbet (eds.), *Contemporary Social Problems* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1976), pp. 63-64.
90. Public skepticism regarding low economic status as a cause of crime is strongly — and perhaps surprisingly — evident in a number of public opinion polls that show only a small proportion of those interviewed are willing to accord a major or important role to factors such as poverty and unemployment. See U.S. Department of Justice, *Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics — 1974* (Washington, D.C.: Supt. of Docs., U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1976), pp. 176-177.
91. See Willem Bongers, *Criminality and Economic Conditions*, with an Introduction by Austin Turk (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1969), pp. 3-12.
92. See Jock Young, Tony Platt, et al., *Critical Criminology* (London: Routledge & Degan Paul, 1975).
93. See, for example, Richard Quinney, *Criminology* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1975), pp. 9-13.
94. Ian Taylor, Paul Walton, and Jock Young, "Critical Criminology in Britain: Review and Prospects," in Ian Taylor, et al., *op. cit.*, p. 34. Emphasis as in the original.
95. See Richard Quinney, *op. cit.*, p. 99.

96. See Richard Quinney, *Class, State, and Crime* (New York: David McKay, 1977). "Much of what the young radical intellectuals call radical social analysis," says Milton Mankoff, "is really more akin to the muckraking of the Populist and Progressive eras; documentation of injustice and inequality, conspiratorial behavior, a preoccupation with unmasking the corporate affiliations of governmental and other institutional elites, and a tendency to indict persons rather than examining the institutional context within which they operate." See Milton Mankoff, *The Poverty of Progress* (New York: Holt, Rhinehart, and Winston, 1972), p. 4.
97. See Gwynn Nettler, *op. cit.*, p. 117.
98. See Robert Theobald (ed.), *The Guaranteed Income* (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Books, 1967), p. 27.
99. *Ibid.*, p. 29.
100. See Robert H. Davis, "The Advance of Cybernation: 1965-85," and Ben B. Seligman, "Automation and the Work Force," in Robert Theobald, *ibid.*, pp. 39-68 and pp. 69-92. See also Robert Perrucci and Marc Pilisuk (eds.), *The Triple Revolution Emerging* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971), pp. 157-219.
101. See Gresham M. Sykes, *Social Problems in America* (Glenview, Ill.: Scott, Foresman, 1971), Chapter V.
102. *Ibid.*, p. 189.
103. See Eric Morgenthau, "European Youths, Hard Hit by Unemployment, Are Posing Major Political and Social Problems," *The Wall Street Journal*, June 21, 1977; and Daniel Bell, "The Future World Disorder," *Foreign Policy*, No. 27, Summer 1977, pp. 109-135.
104. Eric Morgenthau, *op. cit.*
105. The latter problem is apt to be particularly acute for the lower-class members of minority groups who may find themselves being left further and further behind in a technological society that no longer needs unskilled labor. See Sidney M. Willhelm, *Who Needs the Negro?* (Cambridge, Mass., 1970); see also Daniel Bell, *op. cit.*, p. 130.
106. The length of unemployment, previous work histories, age, occupational level held in the past and anticipated in the future, the employment (or unemployment) of other family members, the availability of unemployment benefits, the stigma imposed by the self and by others — all, presumably, could influence the meaning of unemployment in different time periods and change the relationship between unemployment and crime.
107. For an excellent analysis of the developing concern with the problems of economic growth, see H.S.D. Cole, et al. (eds.) *Models of Doom* (New York: University Books, 1973); see also Donella H. Meadows et al., *The Limits to Growth* (New York: The New American Library, 1972).
108. See Alvin Toffler, *The Eco-Spasm Report* (New York: Bantam Books, 1975), p. 3.
109. See Rudolf Klein, "The Trouble with a Zero-Growth World," *The New York Times Magazine*, June 2, 1974.

110. See Lester C. Thurow, "The Myth of the American Economy," *Newsweek*, February 14, 1977; and Thomas C. Cochran, *200 Years of American Business* (New York: Basic Books, 1977).

111. See Gresham M. Sykes, *op. cit.*, p. 216.

112. See Rudolf Klein, *op. cit.*

113. See U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports, Series P-60, No. 103, "Money Income and Poverty Status of Families and Persons in the United States: 1975 and 1974 Revisions," (Advance Report), Supt. of Docs., U.S. Govt. Print. Off., Washington, D.C., 1976. The poverty threshold, updated annually to reflect changes in the Consumer Index, was \$5,500 for a nonfarm family of four in 1975.

114. Peter F. Drucker, *The Unseen Revolution: How Pension Fund Socialism Came to America* (New York: Harper & Row, 1976), p. 2.

115. See John Kenneth Galbraith, *Economics and Public Power* (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1973). See also Ralph Miliband, "Professor Galbraith and American Capitalism: The Managerial Revolution Revisited," in Milton Man-koff (ed.), *The Poverty of Progress* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1972), pp. 46-58.

116. See Herman Kahn, et al., *The Next 200 Years* (New York: William Mor-row, 1976), pp. 24-25.

117. See, for example, Stephen Rosen, *Future Facts: A Forecast of the World As We Will Know It Before the End of the Century* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1976).

118. See Edwin H. Sutherland and Donald R. Cressey, *op. cit.*, pp. 236-240.

119. Albert K. Cohen, *Delinquent Boys* (New York: The Free Press, 1955). The values of the middle class do not vanish completely for the lower-class boy, notes Cohen. Rather, they are likely to be pushed into the unconscious mind. The result of this repression is an ever-present but obscurely felt threat and manifests itself as anxiety and is countered by a reaction-formation — a conscious, compulsive, and excessive rejection of the middle-class world. *Ibid.*, p.133.

120. See Gwynn Nettler, *op. cit.*, p. 106.

121. See Edwin H. Sutherland and Donald R. Cressey, *op. cit.*, pp. 236-240.

122. *Ibid.*, pp. 78-79.

123. See U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Historical Statistics of the United States, Colonial Times to 1970*.

124. See U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, *Projection of Education Statistics to 1984-85* (Washington, D.C.: Supt. of Docs., U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1976).

125. U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Education Division, National Center for Education Statistics, *Statistics of Trends in Education, 1965-66 to 1985-86* (January 1977). See also Nathan Keyfitz, "The Impending

Crisis in American Graduate Schools," *The Public Interest*, Summer 1978, pp. 85-97.

126. See Ivan Berg, *Education and Jobs: The Great Training Robbery* (New York: Praeger, 1970). The need for credentials, it might be noted, in an increasingly technological society, points the way to an increased incidence of fraud in this area.

127. See Robin Williams, Jr., *American Society: A Sociological Interpretation* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1960), pp. 417-468. "Some sociologists object to the concept of value as vague and shy away from its use," says Edwin Lemert. "Others argue more strongly that it adds nothing to the explanation of behavior. Yet, despite such dissident notes, both sociologists and anthropologists are being pushed towards some such concept by the nature of the problems with which they must deal." Edwin M. Lemert, "Social Structure, Social Control, and Deviation," in Marshall B. Clinard (ed.), *Anomie and Deviant Behavior* (New York: The Free Press, 1964), p. 61.

128. See Ralph Turner, "The Quest for Universals in Sociological Research," *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 18, December 1958, pp. 604-611.

129. See Dennis Wrong, "The Oversocialized Conception of Man," *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 26, 1961, pp. 184-193.

130. See Joseph P. Fitzpatrick, "The Role of Religion in Programs for the Prevention and Correction of Crime and Delinquency," President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, *Task Force Report: Juvenile Delinquency and Youth Crime* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1967), pp. 377-330.

131. Studies of religion and its relationship to crime and delinquency continue to be reported in the literature, but they are infrequent, emphasize institutional membership and participation rather than religious belief, and play little part in most theoretical discussions of crime causation. See Edwin H. Sutherland and Donald R. Cressey, *op. cit.*, pp. 243-245.

132. See David O. Arnold (ed.), *The Sociology of Subcultures* (Berkely, Calif.: The Glendessary Press, 1970). Cohen's book on delinquent gangs is one of the outstanding works in this area, but is concerned more with the social-psychological dynamics of gang activities than patterns of change. See Albert K. Cohen, *Delinquent Boys: The Culture of the Gang* (New York: The Free Press, 1955).

133. See, for example, Herman Kahn and Anthony J. Weiner, *The Year 2000* (New York: Macmillan, 1967), Chapter IV, for an analysis of a possible decline of the Protestant Ethic and the rise of Epicurean and Stoic movements.

134. See Edwin H. Sutherland, *Principles of Criminology* (New York: J.B. Lippincott, 1939), Chapter Five; and Donald Taft, *Criminology* (New York: Macmillan, 1942), Chapter Two. Both writers also stressed the role of individualism in American life—that is, the value of standing alone or remaining free of group ties, both formal and informal. The resulting indifference to stable networks of named people is a distinguishing characteristic of American culture, it has been argued, and greatly increases the likelihood of criminal behavior by reducing social controls. Unfortunately, this theme has received relatively little systematic attention. See, however, David H. Bayley, "Learning

About Crime—The Japanese Experience,” *The Public Interest*, Summer 1976, pp.55-68.

135. See Robert K. Merton, “Social Structure and Anomie, in *Social Theory and Social Structure* (New York: The Free Press, 1968), Chapter VI. The original essay first appeared in 1938.

136. See Albert K. Cohen, “The Sociology of the Deviant Act: Anomie Theory and Beyond,” *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 30, February 1965, pp. 5-14.

137. See Daniel Yankelovich, *The New Morality: A Profile of American Youth in the 70's* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1974).

138. See Gilbert Geis and Robert F. Meier (eds.), *White-Collar Crime* (New York: The Free Press, 1977), Introduction.

139. See Edwin H. Sutherland, *White-Collar Crime* (New York: The Dryden Press, 1949).

140. See Gilbert Geis and Robert E. Meier, *op. cit.*, Introduction.

141. See Robert L. Heilbroner, et al., *In the Name of Profit* (Garden City: Doubleday, 1972), Part Two.

142. This state of affairs is very likely to change in the immediate future, argue Geis and Meier. Growing concern on the part of the legislators, law enforcement officials, and a more militant consumer constituency is likely to lead to the appearance of government and private foundation funds for investigations in the area of white-collar crime. See Gilbert Geis and Robert F. Meier, *op. cit.*, p. 1. See also Joseph F. Coates, “The Future of Crime in the United States from Now to the Year 2000,” *Policy Sciences*, Vol. 3, March 1972, pp. 27-45.

143. See, for example, John C. Fuller, *The Gentlemen Conspirators: The Story of Price-Fixers in the Electrical Industry* (New York: Grove Press, 1962).

144. See Kenneth Sonenclar, “Bogus Transistors for Defense,” *The New York Times*, October 24, 1976.

145. See Jack D. Douglas and John M. Johnson, *Official Deviance: Readings in Malfeasance, Misfeasance, and Other Forms of Corruption* (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott, 1977). Dollars spent on construction, for example, at all government levels, have increased by more than 1000 percent since the end of World War II — presumably having some impact on the nature and extent of illegal business practices in the United States.

146. See Marshall B. Clinard and Richard Quinney, *Criminal Behavior Systems: A Typology* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1973), Chapter 7. For other recent efforts to clarify the concept of white collar crime, see Ezra Stotland, “White Collar Criminals,” *Journal of Social Issues*, Vol. 33, Fall, 1977, pp. 179-196; and Herbert A. Bloch and Gilbert Geis, *Man, Crime, and Society* (New York: Random House, 1970), p. 307.

147. See Erwin O. Smigel and H. Lawrence Ross, *Crimes Against Bureaucracy* (New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1970); see also Herman Mannheim. *Criminal Justice and Social Reconstruction* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946).

148. Max Lerner, *America As a Civilization* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1967), p. 297.

149. See Norman Jaspan, *The Thief in the White Collar* (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott, 1960), pp. 11-12.

150. See The President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, *Task Force Report: Assessment of Crime* (Washington, D.C.: Supt. of Docs., U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1967), p. 49.

151. See the Chamber of Commerce, *White-Collar Crime* (Washington, D.C.: Chamber of the United States, 1974), p. 5.

152. Donald Horning, in a study of theft among blue-collar workers in an industrial plant, also found that an ambiguous view of corporate ownership was an important factor. A variety of company property was seen as not clearly owned by anyone, particularly small components and tools. Pilfering such property was frequently defined not as stealing, but as "taking things from the plant," "Blue Collar Theft," in Smigel and Ross, *op. cit.*, pp. 46-64.

153. See "The Increasing Binary Nature of Crime," *The New York Times*, July 11, 1976. See also Brandt Allen, "Embezzler's Guide to the Computer," *Harvard Business Review*, Vol. 53, July-August 1975, pp. 79-89.

154. See Charles A. Reich, "The New Property," *The Yale Law Journal*, Vol. 73, April 1964, p.

155. See Robert T. Hall, *The Morality of Civil Disobedience* (New York: Harper & Row, 1971); Ernest van den Haag, *Political Violence and Civil Disobedience* (New York: Harper & Row, 1972); and Robert A. Goldman (ed.), *Civil Disobedience* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1968).

156. See Gresham M. Sykes, *op. cit.*, p. 215.

157. Stephen Schafer, *The Political Criminal: The Problem of Morality and Crime* (New York: The Free Press, 1974), p. 7.

158. See Marshall M. Clinard and Richard Quinney, *op. cit.*, pp. 159-160.

159. See Robert K. Merton and Robert Nisbet, *Contemporary Social Problems*, (New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1976), pp. 29-32.

160. See, however, Kenneth Keniston, *Young Radicals* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1968), for a sophisticated and sympathetic analysis of the personal sources of political dissent in the 1960s. The author draws a line between the alienated and political activities, and within the latter group he distinguishes three types on the basis of the degree of radicalism, but the exploration of behavior defined as political crime falls outside his area of concern.

161. For an excellent analysis of the anti-war movement in the 1960s, see Jerome H. Skolnick, *The Politics of Protest* (New York: Ballantine Books, 1969). It is important to recognize, as Skolnick argues, that much of the violence that transformed legal protest into political crime was initiated by public authorities. "While there have been scattered acts of real violence committed by anti-war activists," he notes, "by far the greatest portion of harm has been done to demonstrators and movement workers, in the form of bombings of homes and offices, crowd-control measures used by the police,

physical attacks on demonstrators by American Nazi Party members, Hell's Angels and others. . . ." *Ibid.*, pp. 66-67. In the last years of the sixties, however, the incidence of violence on the part of those protesting the war increased sharply.

162. See Daniel P. Moynihan, *Maximum Feasible Misunderstanding*, (New York: The Free Press, 1969).

163. See Jurgen Habermas, "What Does a Crisis Mean Today? Legitimation Problems in Late Capitalism," *Social Research*, Vol. 42, Winter 1975, pp. 778-811.

164. In 1969 and 1970, there were 3,000 reported bombings; by 1976, the number had fallen to 65. In 1977, however, a government advisory committee cautioned the U.S. Attorney General about the "resilient nature of terrorism and urban disorder," and warned that the police should prepare for possible recurrences of the riots that marked the 1960s. See Dena Kleiman, "The Potential for Urban Terror Is Always There," *The New York Times*, March 13, 1977.

165. *Ibid.*

166. See Jeffrey A. Tannenbaum, "The Terrorists," *The Wall Street Journal*, January 4, 1977. Russian Marxists in the 19th and early 20th centuries attacked the use of terrorism as a political weapon on the grounds that it could never succeed in eliminating the ruling class and that it diverted attention from the serious work of organizing the masses. Today, according to some writers, terrorism is justified by political extremists not simply on the grounds that it gains publicity for a cause, but also on the grounds that it will evoke harsh repressive measures that will spark mass resistance.

167. *Ibid.*

168. See Robert Lindsen, "California Ponders 'The Unthinkable,'" *The New York Times*, February 21, 1977.

169. *Ibid.*

170. See "The Bridge of Sighs," *Time*, August 16, 1976.

171. See "Threat to a City," *The New York Times*, October 30, 1967.

172. See Marshall B. Clinard and Richard Quinney, *Criminal Behavior Systems* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1973), Chapter 6. Defining political crime on the basis of purpose, as we have done in our discussion, presents certain hazards, since purposes are difficult to establish and subject to different interpretations. Nevertheless, this approach appears to open up the most fruitful lines of inquiry.

173. See Theodore L. Becker and Vernon C. Murray (eds.), *Government Lawlessness in America* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971).

174. For an excellent discussion of how and why the police violate the law, see Rodney Stark, *Police Riots: Collective Violence and Law Enforcement* (Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth Publishing, 1973).

175. See Johnathan Schell, *The Time of Illusion* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1976).

176. See Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., *The Imperial Presidency* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1973), pp. 266-267.

177. See Jack D. Douglas, "Watergate: Harbinger of the American Prince," in Jack D. Douglas and John M. Johnson, *op. cit.*, pp. 119-120.

178. See, for example, Morton H. Halperin, Jerry J. Berman, Robert L. Borosage, and Christine M. Marwick, *The Lawless State. The Crimes of the U.S. Intelligence Agencies* (New York: Penguin Books, 1976); Isidore Silver (ed.), *The Crime Control Establishment* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1974); and I.F. Stone, "The Threat to the Republic," *The New York Review*, May 26, 1976. Criticisms of the FBI and the CIA, long a feature in the writing of those on the left, spread rapidly in the wake of Watergate and the Senate Hearings concerning the CIA.

179. Richard Rovere, "Crime in the FBI," *The New Yorker*, August 8, 1977; see also Cathy Perkus (ed.), *Cointelpro* (New York: Monad Press, 1975).

180. See, for example, David Wise, *The American Police State*, (New York: Random House, 1976).

181. See Morton H. Halperin, et al., *op. cit.*, Chapter 11. See also Anthony Lewis, "Not Entirely Pure," *The New York Times*, August 25, 1977. By the summer of 1977, one former FBI official had been indicted on charges that he had conspired with his subordinates to violate Federal law by intercepting mail and wiretapping without a court order. The former director of the CIA had been convicted of a misdemeanor for deceiving the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

182. See Anthony Narro, "Officials Agree New FBI Head Faces Inefficiency, Not Abuses," *The New York Times*, September 6, 1977.

183. "It is not a question of reluctance on the part of CIA officials to speak to us," Senator Leverett Saltonstall has argued. "Instead it is a question of our reluctance, if you will, to seek information and knowledge on subjects I personally, as a member of Congress and as a citizen, would rather not have." Quoted in Morton H. Halperin, et al., *op. cit.*, p. 223.

184. Some notable exceptions, however, are John A. Gardiner's study of "Wincanton," William J. Chambliss' report on "Rainfall West," and Robert Merton's classic article on functions of the political machine. All are to be found in Jack C. Douglas and John M. Johnson, *op. cit.*

185. As James Scott has pointed out, the meaning of personal gain in the definition of corruption should not be construed too narrowly. Politicians, he notes, may illegally divert public funds to their ethnic group or political party, and their behavior would generally be considered corrupt, even though they did not personally profit. See James C. Scott, *Comparative Political Corruption* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1972), p. 4.

186. See, for example, Arnold J. Heidenheimer (ed.), *Political Corruption: Readings in Comparative Analysis* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1970). In 1914, notes Heidenheimer, Walter Lippmann said he had tried to develop "some quantitative sense of the number and kinds of acts that are called corrupt," but wryly added that he had "abandoned the attempt with the mental reservation that, if anyone really desired that kind of proof, a

a few German scholars, young and in perfect health, should be imported to furnish it." (p. 186)

187. See James C. Scott, *op. cit.*, p. 22.

188. See Walter Goodman, *All Honorable Men: Corruption and Compromise in American Life* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1963). However, skepticism about the extent of official misconduct in the era after the Civil War has been expressed by several historians. Ari Hoogenboom, for one, has argued that the amount of political corruption was much exaggerated by those out of office struggling to get in. See Ari Hoogenboom, "Spoilsmen and Reformers: Civil Service Reform and Public Morality," in Arnold J. Heidenheimer (ed.), *op. cit.*, pp. 276-283.

189. James Q. Wilson, "Corruption: The Shame of the States," in Jack D. Douglas and John M. Johnson, *op. cit.*, p. 388.

190. *Ibid.*, pp. 386-387.

191. *Ibid.*, p. 388.

192. *Ibid.*, p. 391.

193. *Ibid.*, p. 389.

194. Sinnathamby Rajaratnam, "Bureaucracy versus Kleptocracy," in Arnold J. Heidenheimer (ed.), *op. cit.*, pp. 546-548.

195. See Bayless Manning, "The Purity Potlatch: Conflicts of Interest and Moral Education," *Federal Bar Journal*, Vol. 24, Summer 1964, pp.

196. See Jethro K. Leberman, *How the Government Breaks the Laws* (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1973), p. 179. See also Herbert B. Alexander, *Money in Politics* (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1972).

197. See George Thayer, *Who Shakes the Money Tree?* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1973), p. 174.

198. See James C. Scott, *op. cit.*, p. 23.

199. See Gresham M. Sykes, "The Future of Criminality," *American Behavioral Scientist*, Vol. 15, January-February 1972, pp. 403-419.

200. See, for example, Timothy D. Schellhardt, "Arresting Forcecast," *The Wall Street Journal*, Oct. 3, 1977; see also "Perceptions of Crime Seem to Be Leveling," *The Washington Post*, Dec. 18, 1977.

201. See U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Current Population Reports*, Series P-25, No. 601, "Projections of the Population of the United States: 1975 to 2050." (Washington, D.C.: Supt. of Docs., Govt. Print. Off., 1975), p. 136.

202. See Marvin F. Wolfgang, "Real and Perceived Changes of Crime and Punishment," *Daedalus*, Vol. 107, Winter 1978, pp. 143-157.

203. See Gresham M. Sykes and David Matza, "Techniques of Neutralization," *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 22, December 1957, pp. 664-670.

204. See for example, Francis A. Allen, *The Borderland of Criminal Justice* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1964); Norval Morris, "The Future of Imprisonment: Toward a Punitive Philosophy," *Michigan Law Review*, Vol.

72, May 1972, pp. 1161-80; Robert Martinson, "What Works?—Questions and Answers About Prison Reform," in Seymour L. Halleck et al., eds., *The Aldine Crime and Justice Annual 1974* (Chicago: Aldine, 1975), pp. 352-84; and James Q. Wilson, *Thinking About Crime* (New York: Basic Books, 1975).

205. See Michael J. Hindelang, *Public Opinion Regarding Crime* (Washington, D.C.: Supt. of Docs., U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1975).

206. For a discussion of the deterrent effect of criminal sanctions for certain forms of corporate crime, see Sanford H. Kadish, "Some Observations on the Use of Criminal Sanctions in Enforcing Economic Regulations," *The University of Chicago Law Review*, Vol. 30, Spring 1963, pp. 423-449; and Harry V. Ball and Lawrence M. Friedman, "The Use of Criminal Sanctions in the Enforcement of Economic Legislation: A Sociological View," *Stanford Law Review*, Vol. 17, January 1965, pp. 197-223.

207. A growing interest in "hardening the target" as a means of combatting crime can now be observed for many types of offenses. See National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, *A National Strategy to Reduce Crime* (New York: Avon, 1974). This approach is likely to be particularly attractive in the case of middle-class property offenses, however, if rehabilitation and imprisonment are seen as inappropriate and criminal sanctions turn out to have a limited utility.

208. See, for example, Stuart L. Hills, *Crime, Power, and Morality* (Scranton: Chandler Publishing, 1971).



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